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I. INTRODUCTION 
International human rights litigation often showcases the worst in 
humanity—genocide, summary execution, torture, disappearance, and 
war crimes, to name just a few of the atrocities alleged in these cases 
over the past several years.1  In the United States, the principal vehicle 
for litigating these human rights violations is the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),2 
a famously enigmatic provision of the United States Code enacted by the 
First Congress in 1789.3  ATS suits run the gamut, raising diverse issues 
1. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15–17 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(describing allegations that security forces of Exxon Mobil Corporation engaged in “a
systematic campaign of extermination of the people [of the Aceh province of Indonesia],”
including acts of “genocide, extrajudicial killing, torture, crimes against humanity, sexual 
violence, and kidnap[p]ing”), vacated, Nos. 09-7125, 09-7127, 09-7134, 09-7135, 2013 
WL 3970103 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2013); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d
111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (involving allegations that a multinational energy conglomerate 
aided and abetted the Nigerian government’s violent suppression of the residents of the 
Ogoni region of Nigeria in response to protests against the energy company’s oil 
production in the Niger Delta), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 
550 F.3d 822, 825–26 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (recounting allegations that the government
of Papua New Guinea, in collusion with a British mining company, “engaged in aerial 
bombardment of civilian targets, wanton killing and acts of cruelty, village burning, rape, 
and pillage” that resulted in the deaths of an estimated fifteen thousand people on the South 
Pacific island of Bougainville). 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (providing in its entirety that “[t]he district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed 
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”). 
3. As is often recounted, Judge Friendly once labeled the ATS “a kind of legal 
Lohengrin . . . no one seems to know whence it came.”  IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 
1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).  Indeed, despite the amount and depth of scholarship
produced over the past three decades regarding the origins of the statute, the original 
purpose of the ATS is still subject to debate.  Compare Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort 
Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 619–37 (2002) (advancing the theory that 
the First Congress “viewed at least the law of nations portion of the Alien Tort Statute as
an implementation of Article III alienage jurisdiction”), with William S. Dodge, The 
Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the “Originalists,” 19 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 237 (1996) (interpreting historical evidence as 
showing that the ATS was meant to provide a “broad civil remedy for violations of the 
law of nations”). 
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of international human rights law involving many of the world’s most 
infamous humanitarian crises.4  Despite this thematic variety, ATS cases 
frequently share a common feature: given the brutal events underlying 
many of these suits, the actual victims of the human rights abuses alleged 
are often deceased, missing, or otherwise incapable of litigating their 
claims personally.5  As a result, human rights cases commenced pursuant 
to the ATS are regularly prosecuted not by the alleged tort victims but 
by the victims’ surviving relatives.6 
Deceased-victim ATS cases are nothing new; in fact, the pathmarking 
Second Circuit case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala involved plaintiffs who were 
4. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244,
247–48 (2d Cir. 2009) (Second Sudanese Civil War); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 2
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (Abu Ghraib prison scandal); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 
504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007) (South African apartheid); In re Estate of Ferdinand 
Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (dictatorship of 
Ferdinand Marcos); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Israeli-Palestinian conflict).  Recently, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013), the Supreme Court dismissed an international human 
rights complaint between Nigerian plaintiffs and Dutch and English corporations, reasoning 
that “all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States,” and thus a presumption 
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law applied to preclude the lawsuit. See id. 
(holding that “mere corporate presence” in the United States does not suffice to “displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application” of federal law).  Although the 
Court’s opinion in Kiobel “leave[s] open a number of significant questions regarding the 
reach and interpretation of” the ATS, see id. (Kennedy, J., concurring), its basic holding 
requiring some connection between ATS suits and U.S. interests potentially limits the ability
of human rights claimants to redress global humanitarian crises through ATS litigation. 
5. See, e.g., Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604, 605–06 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(describing the complaint as alleging that the plaintiffs’ relative was “tortured and killed”
in violation of U.S. law); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(noting that “[o]f the four victim Plaintiffs in this case, one died as a result of the injuries
suffered” as a result of the defendants’ allegedly illegal conduct); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-
Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1258–59 (11th Cir. 2009) (recounting that the defendants
“hired, contracted with, or otherwise directed paramilitary security forces that murdered, 
tortured, or silenced leaders of the trade union representing workers at the Bebidas 
bottling facility”).
6. See, e.g., Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 
54–55 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that “[t]he plaintiffs are several dozen American, Canadian, 
and Israeli citizens, all of whom reside in Israel, who were injured, or whose family
members were killed or injured” by alleged international human rights violations); Aziz 
v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 391 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that the appellants “are either 
victims of mustard gas attacks or family members of deceased victims”); Mamani v. 
Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1150–51 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that “[p]laintiffs are the 
relatives of persons killed in Bolivia in 2003” as a result of alleged international law 
violations). 
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not the victims of the international law violations alleged.7  Yet  
notwithstanding the prevalence of these cases, surprisingly little attention 
has been paid to the basic question of whether nonvictim plaintiffs may 
nonetheless bring suit and recover damages for the violations at issue. 
Indeed, many of the most prominent cases in ATS law—including 
Filartiga—took for granted the fact that the claimants before the court 
were not the actual victims of the human rights abuses alleged.8  Similarly, 
legal commentary has largely ignored this open question of ATS 
jurisprudence, devoting more energy to defining the role of customary 
international law in domestic courts.9 
Absent authoritative guidance on this issue, courts confronted with the 
deceased-victim scenario have generally framed the relevant inquiry as a 
question of plaintiff “standing” under the ATS.10  The ATS, however, 
7. 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (construing the plaintiffs’ complaint to raise
claims of torture in violation of the law of nations but indicating that the plaintiffs were 
not themselves subject to the alleged illegal conduct).  Prior to Filartiga, only a handful 
of cases utilized the ATS as a basis for jurisdiction. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal 
Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 4 n.15 (1985) (reporting that from the time of the ATS’s 
enactment to Filartiga, “plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction under the statute in only . . . 21 
cases”).
8. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 236–37 (2d Cir. 1995) (failing to 
consider whether the nonvictim plaintiffs could rightfully sue for damages on claims 
based on harm to deceased parties); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776–77 (Edwards, J., concurring) 
(same); id. at 799–802 (Bork, J., concurring) (same); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 
860, 862–64 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (same). 
9. See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the 
Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 719–23 (2012) (recounting the 
first significant period of ATS scholarship as centering around the status of customary 
international law in domestic courts); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in 
Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 
153, 153–54 (describing “one of the sharpest and most bitter debates in recent international 
legal scholarship” as regarding whether federal courts may “interpret and enforce customary 
international law (CIL) as federal common law”).
10. See, e.g., Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1342–43 
(11th Cir. 2011) (analyzing the nonvictim plaintiffs’ ability to bring suit as a question of
standing “both as a constitutional requirement and in terms of whether the [nonvictim
plaintiffs] possess a cause of action”); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 96 Civ. 
8386(KMW)(HBP), 01 Civ. 1909(KMW)(HBP), 02 Civ. 7618(KMW)(HBP), 2009 WL
464946, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009) (construing the defendants’ objections to the 
nonvictim plaintiffs’ ability to sue as an objection to their “statutory standing”); Bowoto 
v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,
2006) (accepting the defendants’ characterization of their argument regarding the nonvictim 
plaintiff’s authority to sue as a “lack [of] standing”); Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-
Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (same); Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 367–69 (E.D. La. 1997) (same); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 
886 F. Supp. 162, 189, 192 (D. Mass. 1995) (same); see also  BETH STEPHENS ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 232–35 (2d ed. 2008) 
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has always been an awkward fit for the source of these substantive 
requirements, given its obscure origins and concise phrasing.11 This 
criticism became all the more trenchant after the Supreme Court’s 
reorienting decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, which clarified that the 
ATS is a purely jurisdictional provision that simply opened the federal 
courts to substantive causes of action based in federal common law.12 
Still, even after Sosa, the prevailing standing formulation remained the 
only game in town on the deceased-victim issue, leaving courts to 
develop a patchwork of ATS standing rules drawn from state, federal, 
and even foreign law sources.13  Not surprisingly, this ad hoc approach 
has resulted in inconsistent and at times illogical results for human rights 
plaintiffs in federal court.14 
This Article aims to make sense of this neglected area of ATS law. 
I contend that the salient issue in these deceased-victim cases is not 
whether the nonvictim plaintiffs have standing to sue but rather whether 
they have a viable cause of action in the first place.  Standing and cause 
of action concepts have an uneasy relationship in law.15  Although the 
(addressing the question of who can sue for human rights violations to a deceased party
as raising an issue of “standing to sue for . . . wrongful death or disappearance”). 
11. See, e.g., Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 189 (noting that the ATS is “silent 
concerning a plaintiff’s standing to bring suit based on injury to another”); see also 
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 10, at 45 (“The ATS gives no guidance as to standing to sue 
and the required relationship between the victim and the alleged violation.”).
12. 542 U.S. 692, 714, 724 (2004) (holding that the ATS is “jurisdictional in the
sense of addressing the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain 
subject” but that the “jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the 
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest 
number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time”);
see also infra notes 25–44 and accompanying text. 
13. See, e.g., Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *9 (applying New York state law to
determine whether relatives of deceased international human rights victims could 
properly bring suit in an ATS action); Bowoto, 2006 WL 2455761, at *11–12 (applying 
Nigerian law to a similar question); see also infra notes 59–76 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 106–28 and accompanying text. 
15. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010) (expressing “a
marked desire to curtail” so-called “drive-by jurisdictional rulings, which too easily . . . 
miss the critical differences between true jurisdictional conditions and nonjurisdictional
limitations on causes of action” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (“It is firmly established
in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to [an] arguable) cause of action does 
not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or constitutional power 
to adjudicate the case.”); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) 
(explaining the lower court’s error in conflating the standing and cause of action 
387 
distinction between constitutional standing and cause of action inquiries 
is well established,16 the division is less clear where, as here, standing 
doctrine is used to define a plaintiff’s eligibility to bring suit.  Indeed, 
reliance on standing terminology in this context often obscures and confuses 
what should otherwise be a straightforward determination into the merits 
of a litigant’s claim.17  Building on this insight, I argue that, at bottom, 
the deceased-victim issue in ATS cases turns not on statutory standing 
principles but on whether the plaintiff satisfies the substantive conditions 
that trigger recovery.  In this way, the alternative framework I propose 
recasts the deceased-victim issue as essentially a merits inquiry into the 
nonvictim plaintiff’s eligibility to recover damages.  Given the kinds of 
damages typically requested in these ATS cases, I conclude that wrongful 
death and survivorship principles ultimately govern this analysis. 
Part II of this Article begins with the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion 
in Sosa, which offers the High Court’s most authoritative discussion to 
date on the scope of the ATS and the litigation commenced pursuant to 
its authority.  Although Sosa does not address the deceased-victim issue 
directly, the decision establishes several principles that guide the analysis of 
this open question of ATS law.  Next, Part III examines the prevailing 
approach to the deceased-victim issue, which as described above, adopts 
a formulation rooted in the terminology of standing doctrine.  After 
describing this approach in some detail, I argue that it is untenable in 
both theory and practice, citing different instances in which courts have 
wrestled with the current framework to rather unsatisfactory results. 
Part IV then outlines the alternative framework previewed above.  First, I 
lay out the proposed approach in general terms, comparing deceased-
victim human rights claims to wrongful death and survival actions 
available in traditional tort litigation.  I then argue that courts should 
analyses by describing that a plaintiff’s cause of action “depends not on the quality or 
extent of her injury, but on whether the class of litigants of which [the plaintiff] is a 
member may use the courts to enforce the right at issue”). But see Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 
97 n.2 (“[T]he merits inquiry and the statutory standing inquiry often overlap . . . .  [S]o 
that it would be exceedingly artificial to draw a distinction between the two.” (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
16. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 239 n.18 (noting that “standing is a question of 
whether a plaintiff is sufficiently adversary to a defendant to create an Art. III case or 
controversy, or at least to overcome prudential limitations on federal-court jurisdiction,” 
whereas “cause of action is a question of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the 
class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the power of the 
court”); see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 92 (holding that the question of whether a plaintiff
has a cause of action under applicable law “goes to the merits and not to statutory standing”);
13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 
AND RELATED MATTERS § 3531 (3d ed. 2008) (encouraging “greater care” in 
distinguishing between “complex standing doctrine” and “questions of private right”). 
17. See infra notes 79–90 and accompanying text. 
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recognize a federal common law cause of action for death in violation of 
international law, as well as a federal common law rule of survivorship 
for international law tort claims litigated in federal court. I further 
contend that state law should generally supply the rules of decision for 
determining the proper plaintiff in ATS cases involving deceased victims. 
This analysis relies on federal common law principles deployed in the 
analogous jurisprudential settings of constitutional tort litigation and 
maritime wrongful death law.  Part IV concludes with a discussion of the 
conceptual and practical advantages of the proposed approach as compared 
with the prevailing framework. 
II. THE SOSA FRAMEWORK
   Sosa represents the Supreme Court’s first comprehensive appraisal of 
the ATS since the statute’s enactment in 1789.18 Prior to Sosa, the 
touchstone for most ATS jurisprudence was the Second Circuit’s seminal 
decision in Filartiga, the progenitor of the modern line of international 
human rights litigation in federal court.19  In that case, two Paraguayan 
nationals brought suit against a former Paraguayan police official for the 
alleged death by torture of their young relative at the hands of state 
18. Prior to Sosa, only five published Supreme Court opinions referenced the
ATS, and in none did the Court address the origins and scope of the statute in any depth. 
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484–85 (2004) (noting in dicta that jurisdiction under 
§ 1350 is unaffected by the fact that a plaintiff is “being held in military custody”); 
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 436–37 (1989)
(rejecting the argument that Congress’s failure to enact a “pro tanto repealer” of the ATS 
indicated a legislative intent to permit the continued exercise of federal jurisdiction over 
foreign states beyond the limits imposed by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); 
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549 & n.17 (1972) (listing § 1350 among 
the “many statutes that confer federal-question jurisdiction without an amount-in-
controversy requirement”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 & 
n.25 (1964) (stating that “[v]arious constitutional and statutory provisions,” including § 1350, 
“indirectly support” the conclusion that the act of state doctrine should be “determined 
according to federal law”); O’Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 48–53 (1908) 
(dismissing a claim brought pursuant to the jurisdiction provided by the ATS on the 
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to allege an actionable violation of international law 
or treaty).
19. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES 
COURTS 35 (2008) (observing that Filartiga “triggered a wave of academic scholarship 
and more than a quarter-century of human rights litigation in U.S. courts”); see also 
Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of 
Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 461 (1989) (noting that Filartiga “breathed new life” into 
the ATS’s “little-used and somewhat mysterious provisions”). 
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police.20  The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, but the Second Circuit reversed, ruling that the ATS 
supplied jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims.21  In sustaining federal 
jurisdiction, the court also implicitly recognized the existence of a private 
right of action in federal court for violations of the law of nations— 
today’s “customary international law,” or simply, “international law.” 
The court, however, failed to specify the source of this right beyond 
stating that the ATS works to “open[] the federal courts for adjudication 
of the rights already recognized by international law.”22
   In the years following Filartiga, the majority of courts to address the 
scope of the ATS agreed with the broad outlines of the Second Circuit’s 
ruling, making Filartiga the “standard-bearer” for a new wave of ATS 
litigation in American courts.23  Prominent dissenting voices, however, 
fiercely resisted the emerging doctrinal uniformity, challenging both the 
theoretical underpinnings of Filartiga and the purported benefits of ATS 
litigation.24 Sosa represents the Supreme Court’s initial attempt to settle 
this ongoing jurisprudential debate. 
20. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).  Plaintiffs Joel 
and Dolly Filartiga alleged that the defendant Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, then 
Inspector General of Police in Asunción, Paraguay, “kidnapped and tortured to death”
Joelito Filartiga, Joel’s son and Dolly’s brother, “in retaliation for [Joel’s] political activities 
and beliefs.” Id. The Filartigas brought suit under unspecified “wrongful death statutes,” 
several international human rights agreements, “customary international law,” and federal 
law.  Id. at 879. 
21. Id. at 878, 880. 
22. Id. at 880, 887; see also Childress, supra note 9, at 718 (“[Filartiga] left open 
whether the ATS could provide a private cause of action for a harm under international 
law, or whether it merely opened the federal courthouse doors to such claims, subject to
standard choice-of-law principles that might be used to choose . . . the substantive law to 
be applied.”).
23. See Philip Mariani, Comment, Assessing the Proper Relationship Between the
Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1390 
(2008); see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 10, at 12–18 (describing how by “the fall of 
2003, the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, along with 
district courts in the First and D.C. Circuits, had all applied the ATS more or less as 
outlined in Filartiga”). 
24. Principal opposition to the Filartiga line of authority can be traced to Judge 
Bork’s concurring opinion in the Tel-Oren case.  There, Judge Bork rejected the view that the
ATS either creates an explicit cause of action for suits in violation of international law or 
evinces a congressional understanding that such a cause exists as a matter of federal 
common law.  See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 811–16 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Bork, J., concurring).  Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith expanded upon this 
logic in their seminal 1997 article on the domestic status of customary international law 
(CIL), arguing that CIL was not part of the federal common law post-Erie, and thus 
federal courts cannot properly apply this law absent explicit congressional authorization.
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 856–57 
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A.  Sosa and the ATS 
For a decision heralded as a victory for human rights advocates,25 Sosa 
involved decidedly inauspicious facts and a rather unsavory human 
rights “victim.”26  Humberto Alvarez-Machain was a Mexican doctor 
accused by the U.S. government of participating in the interrogation 
and torture of Drug Enforcement Administration agent Enrique 
Camarena-Salazar by Mexican drug traffickers in 1985.27 After his 
indictment was dismissed in federal district court, Alvarez sued the U.S. 
government and Jose Francisco Sosa, among others, claiming that the 
Drug Enforcement Administration had hired Sosa to capture and transport 
him into the United States to face criminal charges related to Camarena-
Salazar’s murder.28  Alvarez asserted relief in part under the ATS, alleging 
that Sosa’s participation in his kidnapping constituted a tort in violation 
of international law.29  The lower courts agreed with Alvarez on his 
ATS-related claim, but the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that 
Alvarez had failed to assert an actionable violation of international law.30 
In so holding, the Court propounded three basic principles regarding the 
scope of the ATS and the international law tort claims brought pursuant 
to its authority.31 
First, the Court held that the ATS is “strictly jurisdictional,” in that it 
addresses “the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a 
(1997).  Bradley and Goldsmith’s “provocative claims” launched a wave of scholarship 
principally focused on the scope of the ATS and its implications for the domestic status 
of CIL.  See Childress, supra note 9, at 719–22. 
25. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 10, at 20 (“Human rights activists hailed the 
long-awaited decision in Sosa as a major victory, a cause for celebration.”); Burley, 
supra note 19, at 461 (“Scholars and human rights lawyers hailed Filartiga for lending 
judicial weight to President Carter’s human rights policy and opening up a new field of
human rights litigation.”). 
26. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 9, at 165 (stating that advocates of Filartiga-style 
human rights litigation “could not have chosen a less propitious case for the Court to 
review than Sosa”). 
27. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004) (describing allegations that 
Alvarez “prolong[ed] the agent’s life in order to extend the interrogation and torture”). 
28. Id. at 697–98. 
29. Id. at 698.  As the Court described, Alvarez invoked “a general prohibition of 
‘arbitrary’ detention defined as officially sanctioned action exceeding positive authorization to
detain under the domestic law of some government, regardless of the circumstances.”  Id. 
at 736. 
30. Id. at 699, 736–38. 
31. See infra notes 32–44 and accompanying text. 
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certain subject.”32  So construed, the statute does not itself create any 
substantive rights or private tort remedies for violations of international 
law.33  Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the relevant history 
surrounding the statute’s enactment also indicated that the grant of 
jurisdiction was meant to serve as more than a mere “jurisdictional 
convenience” for the benefit of some future legislature in later enacting a 
substantive right of action.34  Rather, the ATS was intended to have 
“practical effect the moment it became law.”35 
This latter observation led the Court to its second central holding: the 
cause of action cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 is a product of federal 
common law.36  Surveying the relevant history, the Court explained that the 
ATS was most likely intended to provide jurisdiction over a limited set 
of actions recognized by the common law at the time of the statute’s 
enactment.37  The Court further concluded that although “the prevailing 
conception of the common law has changed since 1789” in a way that 
reflects a more positivistic understanding of judicial authority, federal 
courts today retain an element of “residual common law discretion” 
allowing them to recognize additional common law causes of action derived 
from present-day international law.38  Although the Court in recent years 
has been reluctant to sanction similar judicial lawmaking in other 
32. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713–14. 
33. Id. at 713 (describing as “implausible” the contention that “the ATS was 
intended not simply as a jurisdictional grant, but as authority for the creation of a new 
cause of action for torts in violation of international law”).
34. Id. at 719. 
35. Id. at 724.  The Court based this historical conclusion on evidence that the 
First Congress may have enacted the ATS to address concerns “over the inadequate 
vindication of the law of nations” during the preconstitutional period.  Id. at 717.  Specifically,
the Court pointed to the Continental Congress’s 1781 resolution imploring the states to
provide civil remedies for violations of the law of nations, as well as two well-known 
incidents preceding the Constitutional Convention involving assaults against foreign 
ambassadors, both of which showcased the young national government’s inability to 
provide federal remedies for law of nations violations.  See id. at 716–17.  But see 
Bradley, supra note 3, at 637–46 (advancing the competing historical claim that the First
Congress intended the ATS to implement Article III’s alienage jurisdiction provision and
not to provide a forum for all suits alleging law of nations violations). 
36. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25. 
37. Id. at 724 (“The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest 
number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”). 
38. See id. at 724–25, 738 (“[N]o development in the two centuries from the 
enactment of § 1350 to the birth of the modern line of cases beginning with Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala has categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim under the 
law of nations as an element of common law . . . .” (citation omitted)). But see Bradley 
& Goldsmith, supra note 24 at 852–56 (arguing forcefully that the “suggestion that
federal courts can apply CIL in the absence of any domestic authorization cannot survive
[Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)]” (footnote omitted)). 
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contexts,39 the majority reasoned that in this case the “door is still ajar” 
to “further independent judicial recognition of actionable international 
norms” given both the federal courts’ vestigial “civil common law power” 
post-Erie and Congress’s implicit sanction of this exercise of authority 
since the enactment of the ATS.40 
This lingering common law authority, however, is not unbound, and 
the Court took pains to emphasize several “good reasons for a restrained 
conception of the discretion a federal court should exercise in 
considering a new cause of action” under international law.41  This series 
of considerations underlies the final doctrinal tenet of the Sosa decision: 
any new common law cause of action cognizable under the ATS must 
“rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world 
and defined with a specificity comparable to the features” of the narrow 
set of international law violations actionable at the time of the statute’s 
enactment in 1789.42  These historic paradigms comprise “three specific 
offenses against the law of nations addressed by the criminal law of 
England: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy.”43  In Justice Souter’s words, it was these three 
offenses, “admitting of a judicial remedy and at the same time threatening 
39. Most relevant here is the Court’s recent retrenchment on the availability of 
federal common law remedies for constitutional violations under the Bivens line of 
authority. See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 620, 622–23 (2012) (refusing to 
imply a cause of action under federal common law for alleged violations of the 
Eighth Amendment committed by prison staff at a federal facility operated by a private 
company); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 548–50 (2007) (declining to create a federal 
common law cause of action under the Fifth Amendment in favor of a landowner 
alleging unconstitutional interference with property rights).  See generally Alexander A. 
Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the 
Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 822–24 (2010) (chronicling the 
Supreme Court’s “refusal to extend Bivens liability to new constitutional claims or new 
defendants since 1980”). 
40. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725, 729–31; accord William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: 
Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal System After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 87, 96–100 (2004) (arguing that Sosa endorsed a 
“particularized approach that looks at the incorporation of customary international law 
into the U.S. legal system issue-by-issue”).  But see Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, 
Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
869, 896 (2007) (“There is . . . tension, if not outright contradiction, in the Court’s 
construction of the ATS as both purely jurisdictional and an authorization for creating
causes of action.”).
41. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 715 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68). 
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serious consequences in international affairs, that [were] probably on the 
minds of the men who drafted the ATS with its reference to tort.”44 
B.  The “Sosa Claim” 
   The Sosa decision was a jurisprudential innovation.  Prior to Sosa, 
prevailing jurisprudence was split on the source of the cause of action 
cognizable under the ATS: the Second Circuit adopted the view that the 
substantive right to sue derived from some unspecified, nonstatutory 
source of law, and the Ninth Circuit advanced the theory that the ATS 
itself supplied the private right of action.45  In rejecting both theories, the 
Supreme Court clarified that the right to sue in any ATS litigation comes 
from the federal judiciary’s “civil common law power” and thus is 
principally a product of judicial lawmaking.46 
For present purposes, the practical implications of the Court’s 
determination are twofold.  First, to borrow the words of William Casto, 
Sosa “uncouple[d]” the federal cause of action for torts in violation of 
international law from the ATS.47  As a result, it is no longer accurate to 
say that ATS litigation involves “ATS claims”48 or “ATS cause[s] 
of action,”49 at least to the extent that these descriptions imply that the 
substantive right to sue derives from § 1350.  Sosa squarely held that the 
federal claim cognizable under the statute is a product of federal 
common law.  Therefore, much like other judicially crafted causes 
of action, this newly recognized claim should draw its title not from the 
statute but the court decision to which it owes its existence.50  The claim 
44. Id. at 696, 715. 
45. Compare Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 243 & n.17 (2d Cir. 
2003) (stating that Filartiga did not identify the ATS as the source of the private right of
action for violations of international law), with In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human 
Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he [ATS] creates a cause of action 
for violations of specific, universal and obligatory international human rights standards . . . .”); 
see also Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he [ATS] 
establishes a federal forum where courts may fashion domestic common law remedies to 
give effect to violations of customary international law.”).
46. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25. 
47. See William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for 
Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 664 (2006). 
48. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 749 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 
133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (mem.). 
49. See, e.g., Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth., 642 F.3d 1088, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
50. Accord 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES: ITS AGENCIES, 
OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES § 3:1 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that the “judicially created causes 
of action” for violations of constitutional rights are widely known as “Bivens actions” 
after the Supreme Court case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which first recognized the nonstatutory private right to
sue for constitutional violations). 
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identified in Sosa is thus properly named the “Sosa claim”: a product of 
the Supreme Court’s Sosa decision and cognizable in federal court 
pursuant to the ATS. 
The second practical consequence of Sosa’s ruling pertains to the rules 
of decision applicable to litigation under the newly identified common 
law claim.  As Casto explains, 
The new cause of action envisioned by Sosa is unintelligible unless the well-
established distinction between rights and remedies is kept clearly in mind. 
The concept of a cause of action requires a plaintiff to establish that a 
defendant has violated a legal norm designed to protect the plaintiff and that 
the plaintiff is entitled to a remedy, which typically will be damages in ATS 
litigation.  Under this traditional dichotomy, the norm that is enforced in ATS 
litigation comes from international law and therefore is to a significant degree
beyond the federal courts’ lawmaking powers. . . .  Sosa’s pronouncement that 
the federal courts have discretion to create or deny a cause of action relates to
the remedy rather than the norm.51 
Pursuant to this theory, “[a]ll questions as to whether the defendant has 
acted unlawfully must be answered by recourse to rules of decision 
found in international law.”52  By contrast, all other aspects of the Sosa 
claim are to be governed by domestic law.53  Casto clarifies that although 
these two sources of law are nominally distinct, both form a part of the 
federal common law.54  Thus, although “[t]here has been a tendency to view 
ATS litigation as centered on international law,” the Court’s analysis in 
Sosa “directs us to traditional, well-established concepts of domestic, 
51. Casto, supra note 47, at 638–39. 
52. Id. at 643. 
53. See id. at 641.  Casto explains that, in ATS litigation, “the most obvious divide 
between international and pure United States domestic law is the separation of substance 
from procedure” in that the federal courts will necessarily apply domestic procedural 
rules in ATS cases.  Id. at 642.  Casto adds that domestic law will also govern “a number
of substantive issues that do not bear on the lawfulness of the defendant’s conduct,” from 
the very existence of a private damages remedy for the norm of international law violated to 
the availability of an official immunity defense for alleged perpetrators.  See id. at 643– 
44; see also Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 61, 78–82 (2008) (arguing that post-Sosa, international law governs
“conduct-regulating norms,” whereas federal common law applies to “other rules of decision” 
such as personal jurisdiction and procedure). 
54. See Casto, supra note 47, at 641–42 (explaining that “international law is
incorporated into United States domestic law as a form of federal common law”). 
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federal common law” in fashioning appropriate rules of decision in these 
cases. 55 
III. SOSA CLAIMS BASED ON HARM TO DECEASED VICTIMS: 
THE PREVAILING APPROACH
   Sosa did not have cause to address the question of who is the proper 
plaintiff in an ATS suit where the victim of the international law violation 
alleged is deceased.  The purported victim in Sosa was alive and well 
and was the plaintiff in the lawsuit.56  As described above, however, ATS 
cases frequently concern victims who are not so fortunate.57  In those  
situations, the plaintiffs in the resulting lawsuits are normally the surviving 
relatives or other next of kin of the decedents, raising the question of 
55. Id. at 639.  Casto’s hybrid theory is consistent with the language of Sosa.  For 
one, the opinion makes clear that the norms to be enforced in any ATS litigation are born 
of international law. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004) (“Congress 
intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions alleging
violations of the law of nations.”).  The decision also indicates that the remedy 
for violations of those international norms—the private right to sue for damages in
federal court—derives from the judiciary’s “civil common law power” to create domestic 
legal remedies. See id. at 725, 729–31 (observing that federal courts retain the authority 
to “derive some substantive law in a common law way”).  At the same time, the Court 
elaborated that “the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations” and 
that the exercise of judicial discretion sanctioned in ATS cases involves the creation of
“federal common law rules in interstitial areas of particular federal interest.” Id. at 726, 
729.  The Court’s language in this regard signals that although international law is 
certainly relevant to the litigation of Sosa claims, principles of federal common law 
ultimately determine the rules of decision applicable in any given case. See Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661 (2013) (observing that the cause of 
action in an ATS suit does not derive from “foreign or even international law” but rather 
from “U.S. law”); see also Beth Stephens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The 
Door Is Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 
558 (2004) (“Sosa does not require that every ancillary rule applied in an ATS case meet 
the level of international consensus required for the definition of the underlying 
violation.  As in any case in which the federal courts exercise discretion to recognize 
federal common law, the courts will fashion rules to fill gaps, borrowing from the most
analogous body of law.”); accord Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41–43 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (interpreting Sosa to hold that “customary international law provides rules for 
determining whether international disapprobation attaches to certain types of conduct,” 
while domestic federal common law determines “the nature of any remedy” for these 
violations); cf. Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New 
Approach, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1931, 1932–33 (2010) (“[T]he relationship between
federal common law and international law is not binary but instead is best understood on 
a continuum, with certain aspects of ATS litigation governed by federal common law 
that is tightly linked to international law, other aspects governed by federal common law 
that is not derived from international norms, and still others that fall somewhere in 
between.”).
56. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698–99. 
57. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
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whether these individuals may properly bring suit for injury befalling the 
deceased party.  Absent authoritative guidance on this question, lower 
courts have coalesced around the approach pioneered by Xuncax v. 
Gramajo from the District of Massachusetts.58  The remainder of Part III 
reviews the analytical framework offered in Xuncax and concludes that it 
is untenable in both theory and practice. 
A.  The Xuncax Approach
   In Xuncax, nine Guatemalan nationals and an American citizen 
brought suit against Hector Gramajo, the former head of the Guatemalan 
Ministry of Defense, for violations of state, federal, and international 
law.59  The plaintiffs sought damages for alleged human rights abuses 
perpetrated against them and their relatives by the Guatemalan military 
during the country’s long civil war.60  Gramajo, for his part, refused to 
participate in the proceedings, and default was subsequently entered 
58. 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).  Since Filartiga, only a handful of cases, 
including Xuncax, have directly addressed whether an individual may raise an international 
law tort claim based on injury to a third party.  See, e.g., Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. 
Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 2011); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., Nos. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW)(HBP), 01 Civ. 1909(KMW)(HBP), 02 Civ. 7618 
(KMW)(HBP), 2009 WL 464946, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009); Bowoto v. Chevron 
Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006); Estate 
of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Beanal v. 
Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 365–66 (E.D. La. 1997).  Of the five cases 
decided after Xuncax, all except Baloco relied explicitly on Xuncax’s methodology on 
the deceased-victim issue. See Wiwa, 2009 WL 464946, at *8–9; Bowoto, 2006 WL 
2455761, at *11; Estate of Cabello, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1355–58; Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 
366, 368.  Moreover, a leading treatise on international human rights litigation in U.S. 
courts also relies on the Xuncax methodology in explaining who may be the proper 
plaintiff in ATS suits where the alleged tort victim is deceased. See  STEPHENS ET AL., 
supra note 10, at 232–35. 
59. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 169, 173. 
60. See id. at 169–75.  The complaint described “numerous acts of gruesome
violence inflicted by military personnel” under Gramajo’s “direct command.”  Id. at 169. 
With respect to the Guatemalan plaintiffs, the court described that “[s]ome of the plaintiffs
were themselves subjected to torture and arbitrary detention; others were forced to watch
as their family members were tortured to death or summarily executed; one plaintiff’s 
father was caused to ‘disappear.’”  Id.  With respect to the American plaintiff, Dianna
Ortiz, an Ursuline nun who had been performing missionary work in Guatemala at the 
relevant time, the district court recounted how she had been “kidnapped, tortured and 
subjected to sexual abuse in Guatemala by personnel under Gramajo’s command.  When 
word of her treatment became public, Gramajo defamed her by falsely asserting her 
injuries were inflicted by an angry lover.” Id. at 173. 
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against him.61  Before entering judgment, however, the court explicitly 
addressed the question raised by this Article: whether the plaintiffs were 
eligible to bring suit for harms suffered by their deceased or otherwise 
incapacitated relatives.62 
In analyzing this open question of ATS law, the court made two principal 
assumptions.  First, the court construed the relevant inquiry as whether 
the plaintiffs had “standing to bring suit based on injury to another.”63 
By “standing,” the court apparently meant to refer to the concept of 
statutory standing under the ATS, as opposed to constitutional standing 
under Article III.64  Statutory standing generally refers to the issue of 
“whether a statute creating a private right of action authorizes a particular 
plaintiff to avail herself of that right of action.”65  Although Sosa later 
clarified that the ATS does not provide a substantive right of action for 
torts in violation of international law, Xuncax read the prevailing precedent 
61. Id. at 169. 
62. See id. at 169, 189–92.  Three plaintiffs, Teresa Xuncax, Juan Doe, and Elisabet 
Pedro-Pascual, alleged summary execution claims based on the unlawful killings of their 
respective relatives.  Id. at 169–70, 184.  One plaintiff, Jose Alfredo Callejas, alleged a 
disappearance claim based on the alleged abduction of his father. Id. at 171, 184.  Teresa 
Xuncax and Juan Doe also raised torture and arbitrary detention claims on behalf of 
deceased relatives. Id. at 184.  Plaintiff Juan Diego-Francisco asserted torture and arbitrary 
detention claims for himself and on behalf of his wife.  Id. at 169, 184.  The decision did 
not indicate whether Diego-Francisco’s wife was alive at the time of the lawsuit.  See id. 
at 170 (recounting that after being released from military custody, Diego-Francisco “left 
for Mexico that same day with his wife”).
63. Id. at 189. 
64. Constitutional standing under Article III requires plaintiffs to establish that 
they suffered an “injury in fact” that is “fairly traceable” to the defendants’ conduct and 
that a favorable judicial determination is likely to redress the injury. See, e.g, Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).  The court in Xuncax did not once mention these Article 
III limitations in its discussion of the plaintiffs’ eligibility to bring suit based on injury to 
their relatives.  See 886 F. Supp. at 189–92. 
65. See Radha A. Pathak, Statutory Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 OKLA. 
L. REV. 89, 91 (2009).  Supreme Court decisions have also suggested that statutory 
standing implicates the prudential “zone of interests” test for party standing.  See, e.g., 
Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 287 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(stating that an “element of statutory standing is compliance with . . . the ‘zone-of-interests’ 
test, which seeks to determine whether, apart from the directness of the injury, the 
plaintiff is within the class of persons sought to be benefitted by the provision at issue”). 
However, the Court has never clearly articulated the relationship between these two 
variants of standing law.  See Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 127 n.12 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (noting that the Supreme Court has previously labeled the zone of interests 
test as a statutory standing inquiry but that courts have treated the inquiries as separate on
different occasions); cf. Robert H. Marquis, The Zone of Interests Component of the Federal 
Standing Rules: Alive and Well After All?, 4 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 261, 286 (1981) 
(arguing for the elimination of “any theoretical distinction between the tests applicable in 
determining the existence of an implied statutory right of action against governmental 
and against private defendants”). 
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at the time as supporting the alternate conclusion that “§ 1350 yields 
both a jurisdictional grant and a private right to sue for tortious violations of 
international law (or a treaty of the United States).”66 
The second assumption underlying the court’s approach was that 
federal law should supply the applicable rules of decision for claimant 
standing under the ATS.67 Noting that the ATS is “silent” on the issue 
of standing, the court cited the conventional practice of borrowing 
substantive requirements from “analogous state statutes” to furnish 
“important details” missing from a federal cause of action.68  The court 
explained, however, that analogous federal provisions may be borrowed 
where the “application of the state law would defeat the purpose of the 
federal statute . . . or if there is a special federal need for uniformity.”69 
With this rubric in mind, the court ultimately chose to apply the 
liability provisions of the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), a 
federal statute establishing causes of action for extrajudicial killing and 
torture.70  According to the court, the TVPA permitted recovery for harms 
suffered by third parties only by “a claimant in an action for wrongful 
death.”71  Moreover, the court ruled that although forum state law generally 
defines who qualifies as a wrongful death claimant, the TVPA also permits 
the use of “foreign law recognizing a claim by a more distant relation in 
a wrongful death action” where “application of Anglo-American law would 
result in no remedy whatsoever for an extrajudicial killing.”72  Relying 
on this interpretation of the statute, the court then applied a combination 
of state and foreign law to determine each plaintiff’s standing to sue.73 
66. 886 F. Supp. at 179–80; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 
774, 780 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (construing Filartiga to hold that 
“aliens granted substantive rights under international law may assert them under § 1350”).
67. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191–92. 
68. Id. at 189–90. 
69. Id. at 190 (citation omitted). 
70. See id. at 191 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil 
Action § 2(a)(2))). 
71. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil Action 
§ 2(a)(2))).  The court also noted that the TVPA permits recovery by the victim’s “legal 
representative.”  Id. However, the court did not rely on this language in analyzing the 
viability of the plaintiffs’ third party claims.  See id. at 191–92. 
72. See id. at 191 (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7 n.10 (1991)). 
73. With respect to the plaintiffs’ summary execution and disappearance claims, 
the court relied on the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act and the Guatemalan Civil 
Code.  Id. at 191–92.  The Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act permitted a decedent’s 
spouse or children to sue for damages, while the Guatemalan Civil Code also gave the 
399 
The court’s decision to apply the TVPA in this regard turned in large 
part on its view that state law is “ill-tailored for cases grounded on 
violations of the law of nations”74 and that using state law by itself as the 
applicable rule of decision would “mute[] the grave international law 
aspect of the tort, reducing it to no more (or less) than a garden-variety 
municipal tort.”75 
B.  Evaluation of the Xuncax Approach
   As described above, the Xuncax approach represents the prevailing 
framework for determining whether a plaintiff may properly assert 
international law tort claims based on injury to a deceased party.76 
Unfortunately, although Xuncax’s analysis has some surface appeal, a closer 
review reveals that it is both inconsistent with governing precedent and 
unwieldy in practice. 
1. Inconsistencies with Precedent
   As an initial matter, Xuncax led with the wrong foot by characterizing 
the relevant inquiry as a question of statutory standing under the ATS.77 
Indeed, by asking whether a plaintiff has standing under § 1350, Xuncax 
necessarily adopted an incorrect and now overruled interpretation of the 
statute—that the ATS supplies a private right of action for violations of 
international law.  Sosa later made clear, however, that the ATS is purely 
jurisdictional and does not create any new substantive rights;78 thus, it is at 
best anachronistic to speak in terms of a plaintiff’s “standing” under the 
decedent’s siblings that right of action. See id. at 191.  As for the plaintiffs’ arbitrary 
detention and torture claims, the court found that neither Massachusetts tort law nor the 
relevant Guatemalan statutes permitted an individual to bring suit on behalf of a third party
victim.  Id. at 192.  Significantly, the court did not explain why Guatemalan law was the 
appropriate “foreign law” to apply in this case.  Presumably, the court turned to Guatemalan 
law after performing some unspecified choice of law analysis. See, e.g., Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 863–65 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying, on remand, principles 
from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 6(2) to determine the 
availability of punitive damages in a case alleging violations of international law cognizable 
under the ATS). 
74. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 192. 
75. See id. at 183 (emphasis omitted). 
76. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
77. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 189 (framing the issue as whether the plaintiffs had 
“standing to bring suit based on injury to another” under the ATS). 
78. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713–14 (2004) (holding that the ATS
is “strictly jurisdictional [in] nature”); accord William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ 
Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 
CONN. L. REV. 467, 479–80 (1986) (characterizing as “simply frivolous” the suggestion 
that the ATS creates a substantive cause of action for violations of the law of nations). 
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ATS because the statute generates no right of action under which a plaintiff 
may have standing to assert. 
   But even if translated into present-day jurisprudence, Xuncax’s standing 
formulation still trespasses salient legal principles.79 Specifically, by 
asking whether the plaintiff in a deceased-victim case has standing to 
sue, Xuncax assumes that the plaintiff possesses a cognizable cause of 
action in the first place.80  On this point, the decision in Dohaish v. Tooley is 
instructive.81  In that case, the plaintiff brought suit for alleged due process 
violations arising from a district attorney’s failure to prosecute an individual 
allegedly responsible for the death of the plaintiff’s son.82  On appeal 
from the district court’s dismissal, the appellate court noted that although 
the lower court had dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for lack of “standing,” 
the “major obstacle” to the plaintiff’s action was instead “the weakness 
in the suit itself,” by which the court meant to refer to the plaintiff’s 
failure to identify a viable cause of action.83  In this regard, the court 
noted that to the extent the plaintiff sought to raise claims on behalf of 
his deceased son, the dispositive question was whether these claims 
survived his son’s death under the applicable survivorship law.84  Moreover, 
to the extent the plaintiff sought damages for his own injuries flowing 
from the death of his son, the court noted that he should investigate whether 
governing law supplied him with a wrongful death cause of action.85 
79. The few courts to address the deceased-victim issue post-Sosa have framed 
the inquiry in terms of the plaintiff’s “standing” to bring suit under the common law 
claim identified in Sosa.  See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 
WL 2455761, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (analyzing whether the “plaintiffs 
lack standing to bring the decedents’ claims under the Alien Tort Statute”); cf. Wiwa v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW)(HBP), 01 Civ. 1909(KMW)(HBP), 
02 Civ. 7618(KMW)(HBP), 2009 WL 464946, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009) 
(characterizing the defendants’ “standing” argument as one of “statutory standing” under
the ATS).
80. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 237 (1979) (explaining that the term cause of 
action traditionally refers to “the alleged invasion of ‘recognized legal rights’ upon which a 
litigant bases his claim for relief”).
81. 670 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1982). 
82. Id. at 935. 
83. Id. at 936 (observing that “[b]oth the question of standing and the question of
legal sufficiency of the action focus on the nature of the plaintiff’s injury and the nature 
of the invasion of his alleged right but different considerations underlie the two concepts”). 
84. See id. at 937. 
85. See id. at 938; cf. Liberty Nat’l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 
553 n.19 (11th Cir. 1984) (applying cause of action analysis, as opposed to standing 
doctrine, to the issue of whether the plaintiff could bring suit under the federal securities 
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Xuncax’s focus on plaintiff standing mirrors the lower court’s mistaken 
analysis in Dohaish.  Specifically, with respect to those international law 
tort claims seeking damages personal to the decedent—claims for 
arbitrary detention and torture—the Xuncax approach fails to consider 
whether these claims survive the death of the actual victim.86  Yet basic 
principles of tort law teach that a tort victim’s cause of action abates 
upon the victim’s death absent explicit injunction to the contrary.87 With 
respect to those claims seeking damages for a third party’s death itself— 
claims for summary execution or disappearance—the Xuncax approach 
similarly assumes that governing law supplies the plaintiffs with a 
cause of action for death in violation of international law.88  Yet after 
Sosa, federal courts cannot so lightly presume the existence of a cause of 
action as a matter of federal common law.89  Thus, as in Dohaish, Xuncax’s 
use of standing terminology obscures the actual issue at stake, that is, 
whether the plaintiffs asserted a viable cause of action.90 
In addition to this substantive obfuscation, the Xuncax approach is also 
ill-advised for its reliance on federal law as supplying the applicable 
rules of decision. Xuncax resolved what it saw as the open question of the 
ATS’s standing requirements by fashioning a federal common law rule 
drawn from the liability standards of the TVPA, a federal statute 
laws because the scope of right to sue under a particular law does not implicate issues of
whether there is a “justiciable case or controversy”). 
86. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 192 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting that the
claims for arbitrary detention and torture were brought “on behalf of a husband, father, 
and wife, respectively,” yet failing to discuss whether such claims survived the death of 
the victims (emphasis added)).
87. See 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51, at 137 (2005); see 
also Henshaw v. Miller, 58 U.S. 212, 222–24 (1854) (holding that actions for trespass to 
land and for tort “did not survive the death of the defendant, but abated upon the 
occurrence of that event”).
88. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191 (announcing that certain plaintiffs have “a cause
of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1350” for the death or disappearance of their relatives in
violation of international law).
89. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725–28 (2004) (describing a
“series of reasons argu[ing] for judicial caution when considering the kinds of individual 
claims that might implement the jurisdiction conferred by the [ATS]”). 
90. See 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 3531 (noting that by construing a 
cause of action dispute as a standing issue, courts often obscure what should normally be
a simple private law question of enforceable interests behind the “special justiciability 
concerns surrounding public-interest litigation”).  Indeed, standing doctrine has largely 
been a product of “litigation asserting the illegality of government action,” implicating 
public concepts of judicial competence and separation of powers that are less relevant in 
the context of a dispute between private persons and often serve only to confuse otherwise 
straightforward private law questions. See id. See generally Lee A. Albert, Justiciability 
and Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote Relationship, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1139 (1977) 
(discussing the relationship between justiciability and ideas on judicial review and restraint 
and concluding that the relationships are incidental and remote). 
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providing damages for extrajudicial killing and torture.91  In choosing to 
adopt the TVPA’s requirements over analogous state law, the court justified 
its position on the authority of Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & 
Associates.92  In that case, the Supreme Court fashioned a timeliness rule 
for civil RICO enforcement actions by adopting a federal limitations 
period over the relevant state provision.93  The Court’s choice of federal 
law over state law in this regard turned on two factors: (1) “the lack of 
any satisfactory state law analogue to RICO”94 and (2) the possibility 
that application of state law would “thwart the legislative purpose of 
creating an effective remedy” for RICO violations.95  Neither factor, 
however, was present in Xuncax. 
With respect to the first factor—the availability of satisfactory state law 
analogues—Xuncax itself recognized that Massachusetts law provided 
readily apparent analogues to the plaintiffs’ claims.96  Actions under the 
Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act approximated the plaintiffs’ claims 
for summary execution and disappearance, and state law claims for personal 
injury mirrored those for arbitrary detention and torture.97 Xuncax 
discarded these state law parallels, however, on the grounds that “municipal 
law is ill-tailored for cases grounded on violations of the law of 
nations.”98  But as the Supreme Court has observed, domestic law for 
centuries has recognized international law as part of the general common 
law.99  Thus, municipal law is quite accustomed to adjudicating disputes 
involving international law violations.100  More to the point, even if state 
law is generally unfamiliar with violations of the scale and seriousness 
of present-day human rights claims, municipal codes are certainly familiar 
91. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191. 
92. Id. at 190–92 (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483
U.S. 143 (1987)).
93. Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 149–50. 
94. See id. at 152. 
95. See id. at 154. 
96. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191–92. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 192. 
99. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (“For two centuries we
have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.”); 
see also Ku & Yoo, supra note 9, at 202 (noting that “most scholars agree that CIL formed 
part of the general common law” pre-Erie). 
 100. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 9, at 202–03 (recounting how early state court 
decisions applied CIL independently of federal courts). 
403 
with legal principles regarding recovery for death and personal injury, 
precisely the decisional rules relevant to Xuncax’s inquiry.101 
Regarding the second factor in Agency Holding, the adoption of state 
law as the applicable rule of decision would not “thwart the legislative 
purpose” behind the federal claim. As the Supreme Court described, the 
First Congress envisioned the common law claim recognized in Sosa as 
providing an essential remedy for certain widely accepted and clearly 
defined violations of the law of nations.102  Applying state law to determine 
who may litigate these claims would not impinge upon that remedial 
objective in any meaningful way.  In fact, the application of state law in 
Xuncax would have permitted a remedy for the violations alleged—the 
decedents’ spouses and children could have recovered for death damages, 
and the decedents’ personal representatives could have recovered personal 
injury damages on behalf of the deceased.103  Simply because state law 
would have barred recovery for one class of plaintiffs—siblings—does 
not mean the federal interest had been “thwarted.”104  Thus, contrary to 
Agency Holding, Xuncax was wrong to rely on federal law for the 
applicable rules of decision on the deceased-victim issue.105 
 101. See 1 STUART M. SPEISER & JAMES E. ROOKS, JR., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL 
DEATH §§ 1:15, 13:28 (4th ed. 2005) (describing state laws on wrongful death and
survival). 
 102. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714–24. 
 103. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 190–92. 
 104. Cf. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (holding that state law 
did not undermine the effectiveness of a federal remedial scheme where it barred the 
plaintiff’s claim but was not otherwise generally “inhospitable” to the federal remedy); 
see also infra notes 243–54 and accompanying text. 
105. Moreover, even if Xuncax was right to turn to federal law for the relevant 
substantive standards, the court misread the TVPA as permitting courts to look to foreign 
law in determining the proper plaintiff.  As described above, the court held that under the 
TVPA, courts could apply foreign law as the applicable rule of decision where 
“application of Anglo-American law would result in no remedy whatsoever” for the ATS
claimant.  See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191.  The court based this reading of the statute 
on an “important footnote” in what it claimed to be the Senate Committee Report on the 
TVPA.  Id. at 191 (citing S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7 n.10 (1991)). This legislative history,
however, is in no way authoritative on the meaning of the statutory text. 
For one, the Senate Committee Report on which the court based its interpretation 
addressed statutory language that is different from what was actually enacted.  The bill 
that became the TVPA originated in the House of Representatives as House Report 2092 
and was introduced on April 24, 1991.  See 138 CONG. REC. 31,246 (1992); 137 CONG. 
REC. 9071 (1991); see also Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 
106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).  The Senate 
Committee Report cited by Xuncax commented on a parallel version of this legislation 
introduced in the Senate as Senate Report 313 on January 31, 1991.  See S. REP. NO. 
102-249 (1991).  Notably, the Senate version included different language on the proper 
plaintiffs in an extrajudicial killing action: whereas the TVPA permits “any person who 
may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death” to bring suit for extrajudicial killing, 
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2. Difficulties in Practice
   Xuncax’s conceptual failings also foretold the framework’s unwieldiness 
in practice, as courts relying on Xuncax’s analysis struggled to make 
sense of its prescribed methodology for determining the applicable rules 
of decision. As described above, Xuncax held that the ATS shares the 
TVPA’s “standing” requirements and that under the TVPA, courts may 
turn to foreign law to determine a plaintiff’s standing to sue where 
“application of [state] law results in no remedy whatsoever.”106 
Unfortunately, this choice of law rule provided little principled guidance 
to courts adjudicating deceased-victim cases.
   In Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., for example, the court cited 
Xuncax in determining whether an Indonesian citizen could properly 
raise disappearance and summary execution claims on behalf of certain 
deceased victims of whom he was not a relative.107  However, when it 
became clear that the application of state law would foreclose the plaintiff’s 
claim, the court did not then turn to foreign law to answer the “standing” 
issue as Xuncax had instructed.108  Although Beanal did not explicitly 
address its deviation from Xuncax’s methodology, the court likely saw 
no need to resort to foreign law because Xuncax’s holding was technically 
the Senate bill permitted “a beneficiary in a wrongful death action” to bring suit. 
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil Action), with S. REP. NO. 
102-249, at 7.  It was to this latter language that the footnote in the Senate Committee 
Report referred.  S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7 n.10 (1991). 
But even discounting the difference in statutory language, basing the TVPA’s interpretation
on such tenuous evidence of legislative intent runs counter to explicit precedent on the 
utility of legislative history in statutory construction. See Shannon v. United States, 
512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994) (holding that courts should not give “authoritative weight 
to a single passage of legislative history that is in no way anchored in the text of the 
statute”); accord Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 1328 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“[C]ourts have no authority to enforce principles gleaned solely from legislative history
that has no statutory reference point.” (quoting United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1573, 
1577 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted))); see also Wis. 
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting 
“how unreliable Committee Reports are—not only as a genuine indicator of congressional 
intent but as a safe predictor of judicial construction”). 
 106. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191. 
 107. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. 362, 366, 368 (E.D. La. 
1997). 
 108. See id. (applying Louisiana wrongful death law to conclude that the plaintiff 
“lacks . . . standing to sue on behalf of victims of disappearance or summary execution 
under § 1350”). 
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limited to persons related to the deceased,109 and the plaintiff in Beanal 
“ha[d] not identified himself as a relative of any victim.”110 
A few years later, in Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, the court 
attempted to reconcile Beanal and Xuncax to rather unsatisfying results.111 
Cabello hewed closely to Xuncax’s choice of law principle, applying a 
combination of forum state law and foreign law to the question of 
whether the individual plaintiffs could bring suit for the extrajudicial 
killing of their relative.112  First, the court observed that forum state law, 
Florida, would permit only one of the individual plaintiffs to bring suit 
for the decedent’s extrajudicial killing.113  Following Xuncax, however, 
the court determined that “analogous Chilean law” should apply because 
“Florida law does not result in a remedy for the remaining Plaintiffs.”114 
Under that foreign law, all of the remaining individual plaintiffs 
could bring suit for the decedent’s extrajudicial killing.115  The court 
acknowledged that Beanal, decided previously, “did not turn to analogous 
foreign law” after finding that state law provided no relief to the plaintiffs 
but nonetheless distinguished that case as addressing only “third party 
standing, as opposed to whether an indirect or mediate victim of a wrongful 
death may have standing to sue for extrajudicial killing under the 
 109. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191–92 (resolving the deceased-victim issue with 
respect to plaintiffs who were all relatives or related to the alleged victims). 
 110. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 368. 
 111. See 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1355–58 (S.D. Fla. 2001).  Cabello arose out of the 
1973 killing of Winston Cabello, a government appointee of then-Chilean President 
Salvador Allende.  Id. at 1349.  The complaint alleged that after General Augusto 
Pinochet’s successful coup of the Allende government, military officers in the new 
regime, including the defendant Armando Fernandez-Larios, detained Cabello in 
Copiapó, Chile and then illegally executed him along with twelve other political 
prisoners.  Id. The plaintiffs in the case brought suit for extrajudicial killing, torture, 
crimes against humanity, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.  Id. 
at 1350–51. All these claims were based on harm suffered by the decedent. Id.
 112. See id. at 1355–58. 
 113. Id. at 1357.  The court determined that the “applicable state law” was 
Florida’s wrongful death statute, which provided that “wrongful death actions shall only
be brought by the decedent’s personal representative, when one exists under law.”  Id. 
(citing Benson v. Benson, 533 So. 2d 889, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).  Of the individual 
plaintiffs, only the decedent’s sister, Zita Cabello-Barrueto, had been appointed personal 
representative. Id. at 1350, 1357.  Therefore, the court concluded that only she would 
have “standing” to bring an extrajudicial killing claim should Florida law apply. Id. at 
1357. 
 114. Id. (citing Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191).  As in Xuncax, the Cabello court 
presumably chose Chilean law as the events underlying the plaintiffs’ allegations occurred in
Chile, although the court offered no express discussion of this specific choice of law 
decision.  See id. at 1357–58. 
 115. Id. With respect to the specific foreign law applied, the court turned to Chile’s 
wrongful death law under Articles 2314 and 2329 of the Chilean Civil Code.  Id. at 1357. 
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TVPA.”116  Given the Beanal court’s explicit references to the Xuncax 
framework, however, Cabello’s reasoning on this point is far from 
convincing. 
More recently, a pair of opinions from different federal district courts 
demonstrated the continuing uncertainty surrounding the application of 
Xuncax’s choice of law rule.  In the earlier case, Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 
several Nigerian plaintiffs brought international law tort claims on 
behalf of relatives killed in a “series of brutal attacks” occurring in and 
around Nigeria in the mid- to late-1990s.117  The defendants asserted that 
these plaintiffs lacked “standing” under the ATS to sue on behalf of their 
deceased relatives.118  Applying the choice of law rule outlined in Xuncax, 
the court first looked to forum state law, California, but concluded that 
California law would not allow persons in the plaintiffs’ positions to 
bring suit on behalf of a deceased relative.119  Citing Xuncax and Cabello, 
however, the court then applied Nigerian wrongful death law as the 
applicable rule of decision.120  In so doing, the court did not attempt to 
define the scope of this choice of law principle, although it did cite the 
Beanal decision as authority against relying on foreign law sources 
under certain circumstances.121
   In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., by contrast, the court offered 
some limited guidance on when courts should resort to foreign law 
sources over forum law.122  In that case, Nigerian plaintiffs alleged that 
an international energy conglomerate, acting in concert with the Nigerian 
government, perpetrated a “host of human rights violations” against the 
plaintiffs in response to the plaintiffs’ protests against the energy company’s 
oil production in the Niger Delta.123  The defendants moved to dismiss 
on the familiar grounds that the plaintiffs lacked “standing” to sue for 
 116. Id. at 1357 n.5. 
117. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761, at *1–2
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006). 
 118. Id. at *11. 
 119. Id. (noting that the plaintiffs disclaimed reliance on California law “[b]ecause
the decedents at issue all have surviving spouse(s) and children”). 
 120. Id. at *11–12.
 121. See id. at *11. 
 122. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW)(HBP), 01 
Civ. 1909(KMW)(HBP), 02 Civ. 7618(KMW)(HBP), 2009 WL 464946, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 25, 2009). 
 123. Id. at *1–2. 
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the injuries suffered by deceased third parties.124  The court summarized 
the prior authority on this issue beginning with Xuncax and concluded 
that “[o]nly if the application of state law would defeat the purpose of an 
asserted federal cause of action do courts look instead to the most 
analogous federal statute,” the TVPA, which prior decisions had also 
concluded permitted the use of foreign law.125  The court determined, 
however, that it need not look beyond state law in this instance because 
the plaintiffs were capable of receiving “letters of administration” under 
state law that would allow them to bring suit based on the harm alleged 
to deceased victims.126
   Wiwa’s struggle to reconcile the varying precedents utilizing Xuncax’s 
choice of law framework highlights a fundamental weakness in Xuncax’s 
approach, namely, the lack of any real principle guiding a court’s choice 
of the applicable rule of decision.  Xuncax held that in determining what 
persons are eligible to assert international law tort claims based on harm 
to deceased parties, courts should look to state law unless doing so 
provides “no remedy whatsoever” to the plaintiff, at which point courts 
may then apply “foreign law recognizing a claim by a more distant relation 
in a wrongful death action.”127  But does this rule apply only to plaintiffs 
who are related to the deceased, as Beanal suggests?  Also, what situations 
qualify as providing “no remedy whatsoever”?  As in Wiwa, is it accurate to 
say that state law provides a remedy where the plaintiffs can acquire 
representative status through the forum’s probate laws?  Moreover, even 
assuming all conditions are satisfied to resort to “foreign law,” on what 
foreign law should the court rely?  Cabello and Bowoto answered this 
question with little analysis, but there will undoubtedly be situations 
where the answer is not so evident.128
   All told, the Xuncax framework fails to set out a principled rubric for 
determining whether a given ATS plaintiff may bring suit based on 
international law violations befalling a deceased party.  For absence of 
any alternatives, however, courts confronted with this issue began their 
 124. Id. at *8.  The court noted that the parties had referred “interchangeably” to 
the defendants’ arguments as a lack of “standing” and “capacity.”  Id. at *8 n.30.  The court, 
however, construed the issue as one of “statutory standing,” which implicated “prudential 
considerations” on federal jurisdiction under Second Circuit law. See id. at *8 & n.31. 
 125. Id. at *8 (citing Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 190–92 (D. Mass. 
1995)). 
 126. Id. at *9. 
 127. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 191. 
 128. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 10, at 36 (“Determining what body of law 
governs particular issues in ATS cases is one of the most unsettled post-Sosa issues 
facing the lower courts.”); see also id. at 233 (stating that “[t]he case law under the ATS 
is not always clear about what law applies” to questions of who may bring suit based on 
harm suffered by deceased victims). 
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analysis with the Xuncax decision.  By virtue of its longevity then, more 
than its accuracy, Xuncax has become the prevailing approach for assessing 
a plaintiff’s ability to raise Sosa claims based on harm to a deceased 
victim. 
IV. SOSA CLAIMS BASED ON HARM TO DECEASED VICTIMS: 
A NEW APPROACH 
The prevailing approach to the deceased-victim issue in ATS cases is 
untenable in both theory and practice.  However, the basic principles 
underlying this flawed methodology suggest a new way forward.  Xuncax 
erred at the outset by framing the relevant inquiry in terms of the 
plaintiff’s standing to sue under the ATS.  Although the court’s reliance 
on standing terminology is analytically imprecise, the court’s initial 
instinct to question the plaintiff’s eligibility to bring suit was sound.  At 
bottom, the salient issue in these cases is whether an individual who is 
not the victim of the international law violation alleged may nonetheless 
recover damages for the illegal conduct at issue.  Although it is tempting 
to couch this issue in the language of standing law, the inquiry more 
accurately turns on a straightforward analysis of whether the plaintiff has 
stated a viable cause of action for relief. 
The following Part outlines an alternative approach to the deceased-
victim issue based on this fundamental insight.  First, I explain that the 
search for the proper plaintiff in these ATS cases is essentially a cause of 
action inquiry regarding the availability of wrongful death and survival 
damages.  I then argue that courts should recognize a federal common 
law cause of action for death in violation of international law, as well as 
a federal common law rule of survivorship for international law tort 
claims in federal court.  This Part concludes with a discussion of the 
doctrinal and practical advantages of this proposed approach over the 
prevailing Xuncax framework. 
A.  Wrongful Death and Survival Claims Under Sosa 
Wrongful death actions seek recovery for injuries suffered by one 
person resulting from the death of another.129  By contrast, survival claims 
 129. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 294, at 804 (2000) (“Wrongful death 
statutes create a new action in favor of certain beneficiaries who suffer from another’s 
death as a result of a tort.”). 
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request relief on behalf of a deceased individual’s estate for injuries 
suffered by the decedent prior to death.130  In wrongful death cases, whether 
a given plaintiff can bring suit is a function of the applicable wrongful 
death law, which generally creates a cause of action for the decedent’s 
death and also defines the class of persons that may recover wrongful 
death damages.131  In survival cases, a plaintiff’s right to recovery similarly 
turns on the applicable survivorship law, which typically prescribes the 
categories of claims that survive the decedent’s death and also the persons 
who may sue on behalf of the victim’s estate in any resulting survival 
action.132 
Sosa claims based on harm to deceased victims present situations 
analogous to both of these types of traditional tort actions.  Specifically, 
these claims generally seek either (1) damages for harm to the plaintiff, 
resulting from the death of the plaintiff’s close relative or next of kin,133 
or (2) damages for injuries suffered directly by the deceased relative prior to 
death.134  Claims in the first category approximate wrongful death actions, 
while those in the second category are analogous to survival actions.135 
 130. See id. (“Survival statutes do not provide for an independent action in favor of 
the deceased’s dependents. . . .  They provide for the survival of whatever action the 
deceased herself would have had if she had been able to sue at the moment of 
her death . . . .”).  See generally 1 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 1:13 (describing
the conceptual differences between survival and wrongful death actions). 
 131. See JACOB A. STEIN, 1 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 3:48 
(3d ed. 1997); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 127 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (discussing statutory wrongful death
causes of action).
 132. See 1 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 1:15 (describing different survival 
statutes).
 133. See, e.g., Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th
Cir. 2011) (“[Plaintiffs] allege that the murders of their fathers caused them damages 
including emotional harm, loss of companionship and financial support.”). 
 134. See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455761, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (observing that several plaintiffs “have brought this 
lawsuit on behalf of third parties killed in the attacks and their heirs”); Beanal v. 
Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 369 n.2 (E.D. La. 1997) (dismissing Sosa 
claims made “on behalf of others” who had been killed as a result of the illegal conduct 
alleged). 
 135. See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(accepting the district court’s characterization of plaintiffs’ Sosa claims alleging death or 
nonfatal injury to third parties as “ATS wrongful death and survival claims”); In re 
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(applying survivorship principles developed in the context of federal civil rights jurisprudence 
to an abatement argument advanced in the ATS context); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., Nos. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW)(HBP), 01 Civ. 1909(KMW)(HBP), 02 Civ. 
7618(KMW)(HBP), 2009 WL 464946, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009) (noting that 
plaintiffs’ claims “can be divided into two categories: (1) claims for damages resulting from 
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Thus, as in those more traditional tort actions, the answer to the proper 
plaintiff issue in deceased-victim ATS cases depends on the type of Sosa 
claim asserted.136 
With respect to those cases seeking wrongful death-style damages, the 
inquiry is twofold: the reviewing court must first determine whether 
there is a cause of action under governing law for an individual’s death 
in violation of international law, then, if so, whether the plaintiff falls 
within the class of persons eligible to assert that cause of action.137  For 
ATS suits seeking survival damages, the analysis is similarly sequential. 
Courts must make the preliminary determination of whether the 
decedent’s claim survives the decedent’s death, then, if so, whether the 
plaintiff can properly bring suit on behalf of the decedent’s estate in the 
resulting survival action.138 Under Sosa, all of these questions would be 
governed by federal common law.139  The remainder of this Part addresses 
each point in turn. 
the death of a relative . . . and (2) claims for damages based on non-fatal injuries suffered 
by a deceased relative”).
 136. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 240 n.18 (1979) (holding that the cause 
of action analysis turns on the “nature of the right” asserted); see also 13A WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 16, § 3531.6 (explaining that courts engaged in the cause of action 
analysis must first determine “whether [the] particular category of wrong is ever open to 
correction by injunction, declaratory judgment, or damages,” then, if so, “whether [the] 
particular plaintiff satisfies the conditions on which one or another of these remedies is 
available”).
 137. Cf. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 403–09 (5th Cir. 1961) (performing a 
similar two-step analysis in the context of determining whether the plaintiff may seek 
wrongful death damages for death caused by an alleged violation of federal civil rights 
laws).
 138. Cf. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590–94 (1978) (holding that a 
federal civil rights claim survives in accordance with forum state law, which prescribes 
both the types of claims that survive the death of the victim and the persons eligible to 
then raise those claims on behalf of the decedent’s estate). 
139. As discussed above, under Sosa, international law determines all questions 
regarding the standards and scope of the defendant’s liability, while domestic law 
supplies the rules of decision for all other aspects of the litigation.  See Casto, supra note 
47, at 641; see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661 (2013) 
(noting that the claims underlying an ATS suit do not arise from “foreign or even
international law” but rather from “U.S. law”).  The availability of wrongful death and 
survival actions in Sosa cases pertains solely to the scope of the remedy for violations of
international law alleged, not the extent of the defendant’s liability under the relevant 
norm of conduct.  See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 382 (1970) 
(“[T]he decision whether to allow recovery for violations causing death is entirely a 
remedial matter.”); 1 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 1:13 (noting that survivorship 
laws are “remedial in nature”).  Thus, domestic law will supply the primary rules of 
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1. Wrongful Death Claims Under Sosa 
a. Relevant Precedent 
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether federal common 
law recognizes a cause of action for an individual’s death in violation of 
international law.  Several lines of precedent, however, inform this inquiry. 
First and foremost is Sosa itself.  In that case, the Court focused its 
attention on the distinct question of what types of international law norms 
may support a claim of relief in domestic courts.140 Sosa’s reasoning 
thus pertains primarily to the kinds of legal norms that may be enforced 
through the common law, not the “technical accoutrements” of the 
underlying litigation such as the availability of wrongful death recovery.141 
Nonetheless, given Sosa’s extensive discussion regarding the limits on 
the exercise of judicial discretion in the ATS context, the Court’s analysis 
in that case necessarily guides the present inquiry into the availability of 
a wrongful death cause of action.142
   On that score, the principles articulated in Sosa prescribe that courts 
may devise common law causes of action for violations of international 
law where these judicial remedies comport with the discernible intent of 
Congress.  Sosa held that any claim based on the present-day law of 
nations must rest on a norm of international character that is as widely 
accepted and clearly defined as the trio of eighteenth-century offenses 
against the law of nations recognized in Blackstone’s Commentaries.143 
In delineating this standard, the Court relied upon a “series of reasons 
argu[ing] for judicial caution” in crafting common law remedies for 
decision on these issues. See Casto, supra note 47, at 644 (observing that the availability 
of a wrongful death cause of action under Sosa and the survival of a Sosa claim should 
be governed by federal common law principles).
 140. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724, 725 (2004) (requiring that 
“any claim based on the present-day law of nations . . . rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to 
the features of the 18th-century paradigms” of piracy, infringements on the rights of 
ambassadors, and safe conducts). 
 141. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring); see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 
269–70 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (interpreting Sosa as approving of the 
proposition that the “law of nations generally does not create private causes of action to 
remedy its violations, but leaves to each nation the task of defining the remedies that are 
available for international law violations” (quoting Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 246 
(2d Cir. 1995))). 
 142. See Casto, supra note 47, at 635–36 (stating that Sosa “established an analytical 
watershed” for ATS litigation and that therefore “all analyses of ATS litigation must 
flow from Sosa’s guidelines”).
 143. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715, 732. 
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international rights violations.144  These reasons included (1) the “general 
understanding” that the federal courts’ exercise of common law power 
includes “a substantial element of discretionary judgment”; (2) “the general 
practice” of looking for “legislative guidance before exercising innovative 
authority over substantive law”; (3) the recognition that “a decision to 
create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in 
the great majority of cases”; (4) “the potential implications for the foreign 
relations of the United States” when courts recognize common law remedies 
for violations concerned with the “power of foreign governments over 
their own citizens”; and (5) the apparent lack of any “congressional mandate 
to seek out and define new and debateable violations of the law of 
nations.”145 
Underlying these cautionary factors is a palpable concern that judicial 
lawmaking in the field of foreign affairs may run afoul of the expressed 
intent of the political branches of government, particularly that of 
Congress.146  Thus, in limiting the class of new international law torts to 
those similar to Blackstone’s trio of offenses, the Court found dispositive 
the intent of the First Congress in enacting the ATS in the first place. 
Reviewing the relevant history, the Court concluded that the First 
Congress “intended the ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest 
set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations,” including 
offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conducts, and piracy.147 
Given the cautionary factors described above, the Court then determined 
that these three “historical antecedents” should serve as exemplars for 
any new claim drawn from international law.148  Consistent with the 
Court’s reasoning, any exercise of common law authority to recognize a 
cause of action for wrongful death under Sosa must at the very least 
come to terms with the available evidence of legislative intent on that 
issue.149 
 144. See id. at 725. 
 145. See id. at 725–28. 
 146. See David H. Moore, Medellín, the Alien Tort Statute, and the Domestic 
Status of International Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 485, 496–97 (2010) (arguing that Sosa 
manifests “a separation of powers vision that leaves primary responsibility for lawmaking and
foreign affairs to the political branches rather than the courts”).
 147. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719–20. 
 148. See id. at 732. 
 149. Cf. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 43–46 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(examining the “historical context” of the ATS’s passage to determine whether corporations 
may be held liable for torts in violation of international law under Sosa). 
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Sosa’s deference to congressional attitudes points to another line of 
precedent relevant to the present inquiry. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court recognized a 
private right of action under federal common law for violations of the 
Fourth Amendment.150  This landmark ruling birthed a body of case law 
principally concerned with policing the boundaries of the federal courts’ 
authority to craft common law remedies for violations of constitutional 
rights.151  In that regard, before courts may create a cause of action for 
constitutional violations under Bivens, they must first ask whether Congress 
or a state legislature has enacted “any alternative, existing process for 
protecting the interest” at stake, and then, even in the absence of such 
statutory alternatives, whether there are any “special factors counselling 
hesitation” in the exercise of the courts’ common law discretion.152 
This latter inquiry focuses on the institutional competence of the courts, 
relative to the legislature, to devise remedies implicating sensitive 
government policy.153 
These principles of judicial deference to congressionally designed 
remedies should find even greater currency in the jurisprudence of Sosa.  
Like Bivens actions, litigation under Sosa involves judicially crafted, 
common law remedies for violations of rights guaranteed under a discrete 
body of law: international law, in the case of Sosa, and the Constitution, 
in the case of Bivens.154  Moreover, as with Sosa claims, the nature and 
scope of the Bivens remedy is primarily a project of the federal courts, 
with congressional intent acting as a backstop to judicial discretion.155 
 150. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 395–97 (1971) (“[D]amages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials . . . .”); see also Henry P. Monaghan, 
The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 23–24 (1975) (characterizing Bivens actions as exemplary of the “the long recognized
federal common law process of articulating the remedial implications of federal statutory
rights”). 
 151. See James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and 
Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 125–30 (2009). 
152. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 
U.S. 367, 378 (1983)). 
 153. See 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, supra note 50, § 3:5.
 154. Compare Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (holding that
federal courts may recognize “private claims under federal common law” for violations 
of certain clearly defined and widely accepted norms of international law), with Wilkie, 
551 U.S. at 549–50 (observing that the Bivens line of precedents authorizes “nonstatutory 
damages remedies” for “constitutional violation[s]”). 
 155. Compare Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–28 (“[T]he general practice has been to look 
for legislative guidance before exercising innovative authority over substantive law.”), 
with Bush, 462 U.S. at 389 (refusing to create a Bivens remedy for a NASA employee 
alleging First Amendment violations because “Congress is in a far better position than a 
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The Supreme Court itself relied on Bivens case law in articulating the 
cautionary factors that federal courts must consider when determining the 
scope of the common law remedy for torts in violation of international 
law.156  Given the similarities between the common law remedies in 
Bivens and Sosa, respectively, the principles of judicial deference articulated 
in the Bivens context should also guide the instant determination of 
whether to allow wrongful death recovery under Sosa.157 
Further direction on this issue can be gleaned from the Supreme 
Court’s seminal discussion of American wrongful death law in Moragne 
v. States Marine Lines, Inc.158  In that case, the Court established a 
nonstatutory cause of action under the general maritime law for deaths 
caused by a violation of maritime duties.159  In so doing, the Court overruled 
its nearly century-old precedent The Harrisburg, which previously 
determined that the general maritime law did not furnish a cause of 
action for wrongful death.160  Although Moragne’s precise holding thus 
addressed a specific question of maritime law, the Court’s opinion in 
that case advanced two broader propositions relevant to the availability 
of recovery for death in violation of international law.161 
court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between federal employees on 
the efficiency of the civil service”).
 156. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727 (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68
(2001); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001)) (“[A] decision to create a 
private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of 
cases.”).
 157. See Casto, supra note 47, at 639–40, 645 (relying on Bivens principles to 
propose an analytical framework for litigation under Sosa because “ATS litigation in 
Sosa’s wake is so obviously analogous to Bivens litigation”); see also Harold Hongju 
Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager Lecture, The 2004 Term: The Supreme Court 
Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 13 (2004) (describing the 
cause of action under Sosa as “kind of an international law version of the Bivens remedy, 
a federal common law, civil remedy for a very limited class of gross human rights 
violations” (footnote omitted)).
158. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).  See generally 1 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 1:8 
(describing Moragne as “probably the most important wrongful death case holding in the 
history of American jurisprudence—perhaps, in all Anglo-American jurisprudence”). 
 159. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409. 
 160. See id. (overruling The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886)). 
 161. Accord 1 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 1:8 (noting that although Moragne 
is nominally a maritime case, “its significance and relevance as a precedent are not at all 
limited to the field of maritime law”). 
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   First, in overruling The Harrisburg, Moragne concluded that American 
common law generally recognizes a cause of action for wrongful death.162 
To reach that conclusion, the Court began by acknowledging the general 
consensus among domestic courts at the time that “in American common 
law, as in English, ‘no civil action lies for an injury which results in . . . 
death.’”163  Upon reviewing the history of this common law rule, however, 
the Court determined that “it was based on a particular set of factors that 
had . . . long since been thrown into discard even in England, and that 
had never existed in this country at all.”164  As further proof of the common 
law rule’s disrepute, the Court recounted that as early as the mid-nineteenth 
century, “legislatures both here and in England began to evidence 
unanimous disapproval of the rule,” resulting in the “wholesale 
abandonment” of the rule through state and federal legislation affirmatively 
providing for wrongful death recovery.165  Given these “numerous and 
broadly applicable statutes,” the Court ultimately concluded that “the 
allowance of recovery for wrongful death [has become] the general rule 
of American law, and its denial the exception.”166 
 162. See 398 U.S. at 393 (“[T]he allowance of recovery for wrongful death [is] the 
general rule of American law, and its denial the exception.”).
 163. See id. at 380 (quoting Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 756 (1878)). The Court 
traced the origins of the common law prohibition against wrongful death recovery to “a 
feature of the early English law that did not survive into this century—the felony-merger 
doctrine.” Id. at 382.  As the Court described, although this doctrine “found practical 
justification” in the idiosyncrasies of seventeenth-century English jurisprudence, “[t]he 
historical justification marshaled for the rule in England never existed in this country.” 
Id. at 382–84.  For an authoritative review of the history of the common law rule 
prohibiting recovery for wrongful death, see T. A. Smedley, Wrongful Death—Bases of 
the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1960). 
 164. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 381.  Indeed, the Court observed that the rule represented a 
“striking departure” from “elementary principles in the law of remedies.  Where existing 
law imposes a primary duty, violations of which are compensable if they cause injury, 
nothing in ordinary notions of justice suggests that a violation should be nonactionable 
simply because it was serious enough to cause death.” Id.
 165. See id. at 388–90. 
 166. See id. at 390, 393.  Justice Harlan’s methodology in updating the common 
law to reflect contemporary legislative policies has generated significant scholarly attention. 
See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 151–58 (1982) 
(indicating that Justice Harlan viewed the common law rule that failed to permit 
wrongful death damages as outdated); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 612–14 
(4th ed. 2007) (observing that the Court in Moragne used statutory evolution as a basis 
for overruling a dated decision); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, 
and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 
201–03 (1986) (criticizing Justice Harlan’s reasoning); Note, The Legitimacy of Civil 
Law Reasoning in the Common Law: Justice Harlan’s Contribution, 82 YALE L.J. 258, 
263 (1972) (“The first observation to be made about the [Moragne] Court’s reasoning is 
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The second relevant principle articulated in Moragne pertains to the 
Court’s methodology in recognizing a wrongful death cause of action 
under the general maritime law.  As with Bivens claims, the Court held 
that the creation of a nonstatutory remedy for wrongful death is not 
appropriate where congressional enactments evince a “legislative direction 
to except” the particular right to recovery requested.167  To that end, the 
Court in Moragne characterized its ultimate inquiry as deciding “whether 
Congress has given such a direction in its legislation granting remedies 
for wrongful deaths in portions of the maritime domain.”168  From there, 
the Court evaluated the principal legislative enactments in the field of 
maritime law, the Death of the High Seas Act (DOHSA) and the Jones 
Act, to conclude that “Congress has given no affirmative indication of an 
intent to preclude the judicial allowance of a remedy for wrongful death” 
based on a breach of maritime duties.169  Specifically, the Court concluded 
that “no intention appears that [DOHSA] have the effect of foreclosing 
any nonstatutory federal remedies that might be found appropriate to 
effectuate the policies of general maritime law.”170  This conclusion was 
also “wholly consistent with the congressional purpose” evident in the 
Jones Act of ensuring the “uniform vindication of federal policies.”171
   Together, Sosa, the Bivens line of authority, and Moragne establish 
several principles that guide the determination of whether to recognize a 
common law cause of action for death in violation of international law. 
First, under Moragne, the provision of wrongful death recovery is now 
“the general rule of American law, and its denial the exception.”172 Sosa 
warns, however, that federal courts must exercise “judicial caution” in 
using the common law to devise remedies for violations of international 
rights.173  In particular, any judicially crafted remedies must substantially 
that it flies directly in the face of a good deal of received learning about common law judicial 
views of legislation.”). 
 167. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 393; accord Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 
(1980) (explaining that a Bivens remedy is not appropriate where “Congress has provided an 
alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly 
under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective”). 
 168. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 393. 
 169. Id. at 393–403. 
 170. Id. at 400. 
 171. Id. at 400–01. 
 172. See id. at 393; see also Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Mass. 1972) 
(holding that Massachusetts common law recognizes a cause of action for wrongful death). 
 173. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
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align with the discernible intent of Congress,174 a criterion similarly 
reflected in the Bivens line of authority.175  Therefore, under these 
precedents, federal courts may recognize a cause of action for death in 
violation of international law only where (1) Congress has expressed no 
intent to prohibit this recovery by, for example, enacting an “alternative, 
existing process” protecting the interest at stake, and (2) even in the 
absence of such discernible congressional intent, there are no “special 
factors counselling hesitation”176 or other “reasons argu[ing] for judicial 
caution”177 with respect to the creation of a common law remedy.  The next 
subpart applies these principles to the present inquiry. 
b. Availability of Wrongful Death Recovery Under Sosa
   Federal courts should recognize a common law cause of action for 
death in violation of international law because Congress has expressed 
no intent to bar this relief and there are no “special factors counselling 
hesitation”178 with respect to the creation of this judicial remedy.  First, 
Congress has not enacted any “alternative, existing process”179 addressing 
the interests at stake or otherwise indicating a legislative intent to preclude 
the common law wrongful death remedy at issue here.  The most relevant 
federal statute on the issue of wrongful death recovery for international 
law violations is the TVPA, which “‘establish[es] an unambiguous and 
modern basis for’ federal claims of torture and extrajudicial killing,” two 
widely accepted and clearly defined violations of international law.180 In 
the case of an “extrajudicial killing,” the statute extends a cause of action to 
“any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death” of 
the victim.181  This congressionally designed process does not, however, 
 174. See id. at 727. 
 175. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). 
 176. Id. (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)). 
 177. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
 178. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. 
 179. See id.
 180. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 3 (1991)); 
see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 10, at 140, 148 (stating that “every court to consider 
the issue has agreed” that torture is a “widely accepted, clearly defined violation[] of 
international law” and that “[a]n extrajudicial killing or summary execution is a violation
of the most basic internationally protected right, the right to life” (footnotes omitted)).
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil Action § 2(a)(2)); see 
also Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that the TVPA permits recovery of wrongful death damages in addition to damages 
resulting from injury to the deceased).  As defined by the statute, an “extrajudicial killing” is
“a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable 
by civilized peoples.”  28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Definitions § 3(a)). 
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preclude a nonstatutory remedy for deaths in violation of international 
law.182
   In Carlson v. Green, the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument 
regarding the preclusive effect of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 
the context of a Bivens action for violations of the Eighth Amendment.183 
In that case, the administratrix of the estate of a deceased federal 
prisoner brought suit against federal prison officials alleging that the 
decedent suffered fatal injuries caused by the officials’ failure to provide 
182. Congress has also enacted three additional statutory causes of action that may
potentially be used to recover for death in violation of international law.  The first is 28 
U.S.C. § 1605A, which “provides that designated state sponsors of terrorism may be 
subject to a federal cause of action for money damages if those terrorist states cause or 
otherwise provide material support for an act of terrorism that results in the death or 
injury of a United States citizen or national.”  In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism 
Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 59 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006)).  Second, 
there is 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note, commonly referred to as the “Flatow Amendment,” which 
“provides a private right of action [only] against [individual] officials, employees, and
agents of a foreign state, [but] not against the foreign state itself,” where the foreign state
is a designated state sponsor of terrorism.  See Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  Third is the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308 (2006), which “create[s] a remedy in admiralty
for wrongful deaths more than three miles from shore.” See Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 620 (1978). 
The two former statutory causes of action are primarily designed to “protect American
victims of state-sponsored terrorism,” and in particular, to hold foreign states liable in
damages for acts of international terrorism.  See In re Islamic Republic, 659 F. Supp. 2d 
at 41–49 (recounting the passage of these two statutes and the consequent litigation 
brought under their authority); see also Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 
53, 71 n.16 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that the Flatow Amendment “came into disuse” after 
the D.C. Circuit ruled that it did not provide a cause of action against foreign states). 
DOHSA, as the title suggests, addresses only deaths occurring on the high seas, and 
although the statute could be read to cover certain conduct causing death in violation of 
international law, see, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.
2010), the Supreme Court has stated that DOHSA “does not address every issue of 
wrongful-death law,” Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 625, and further suggested that 
common law claims for international torts occurring on the high seas are not preempted 
by DOHSA. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720 (noting that claims arising out of acts of piracy
are cognizable under federal common law). 
Thus, unlike the TVPA, these three statutes do not represent explicit congressional 
action on the specific topic of wrongful death caused by international law violations.  Cf. 
H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (stating 
that the TVPA is “expressly addressed” to providing a remedy for the practices of “[o]fficial 
torture and summary executions”). 
 183. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19–23 (1980). 
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him with “competent medical attention.”184  In rejecting the officials’ 
argument that the FTCA precluded the creation of a separate Bivens 
remedy, the Court reasoned that the statute’s legislative history indicated 
that “Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes 
of action.”185  These “congressional comments” included statements that 
the FTCA should be seen as a “counterpart” to Bivens and that victims 
of intentional conduct “will have a cause of action against the individual 
Federal agents [through Bivens] and the Federal Government [through 
the FTCA].”186  Based on these and other statements from legislative 
history, the Court declared that the FTCA “contemplates that victims of 
the kind of intentional wrongdoing alleged in this complaint shall have 
an action under [the] FTCA against the United States as well as a Bivens 
action against the individual officials alleged to have infringed their 
constitutional rights.”187 
A similar congressional intent exists here with respect to the relationship 
between the TVPA and the common law remedy recognized by Sosa.  
The TVPA’s legislative history is rife with statements indicating a desire 
to supplement rather than replace the federal remedy for international 
law violations once found in the ATS and now recognized at common 
law.188  For example, the relevant congressional committee report 
acknowledges that “[s]ection 1350 has other important uses and should 
not be replaced.”189  Moreover, the report speaks of the TVPA as 
“enhanc[ing] the remedy already available under section 1350.”190  Most 
significantly, the legislative record explicitly acknowledges that the 
claims subject to the TVPA “do not exhaust the list of actions that may 
appropriately be covered b[y] section 1350.  That statute should remain 
intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in 
the future into rules of customary international law.”191  Although this 
statement refers specifically to the norms underlying the common law 
remedy, the overall sentiment of the TVPA’s legislative history supports 
the conclusion that, as with the FTCA in Carlson, the statute was not 
 184. Id. at 16 n.1. 
 185. Id. at 19–20. 
 186. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2789, 2791). 
 187. Id. at 20. 
188. In describing the relationship between the TVPA and the ATS, the House 
Committee Report reflected the prevailing jurisprudence of the time by noting that the 
federal cause of action for torts in violation of international law “has been successfully 
maintained under . . . section 1350.”  H.R. REP. NO.102-367, pt. 1, at 3 (1991). 
 189. Id.
 190. Id. at 4. 
 191. Id. 
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meant to preclude common law remedies for violations of international 
law.192 
Next, with respect to the existence of any “special factors counselling 
hesitation,” concerns over the judiciary’s institutional competence should 
not bar the creation of a freestanding common law remedy for death in 
violation of international law.193  In  Bush v. Lucas, the Supreme Court 
concluded that “special factors counselling hesitation” preclude the creation 
of a Bivens claim where Congress is in a better position to determine the 
most effective way to remedy a violation of legal rights.194  In that case, 
a federal employee claimed First Amendment violations based on his 
alleged retaliatory demotion from a post at NASA.195  In declining to 
create a Bivens claim, the Court observed that the employee already had 
available to him an “elaborate remedial system that has been constructed 
step by step [through several decades of federal legislation], with careful 
attention to conflicting policy considerations.”196  Thus, the Court reasoned, 
the issue in the case was not “what remedy the court should provide for a 
wrong that would otherwise go unredressed” but rather, whether the 
court should “augment[]” the “existing regulatory structure” by creating 
a “judicial remedy” for the violations alleged.197  Given the legislature’s 
“considerable familiarity with balancing governmental efficiency 
and the rights of employees” in the context of the federal civil service, 
the Court concluded that “Congress is in a better position to decide 
whether or not the public interest would be served” by the “addition of 
another remedy for violations of employees’ First Amendment rights.”198 
192. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980).  The decision in Enahoro v. Abubakar, 
408 F.3d 877, 884–85 (7th Cir. 2005), is not to the contrary.  In that case, the Seventh 
Circuit ruled that the TVPA preempts any common law claims for torture and extrajudicial 
killing cognizable under the ATS. See id. But see Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 
N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 
Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).  Given the TVPA’s legislative 
history recounted above, however, even if the statute provides the exclusive remedy for 
extrajudicial killing, the TVPA should not be read as expressing a congressional intent to 
bar other common law causes of action for conduct causing death in violation of 
international law.
 193. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983).
 194. See id. at 378, 388–89. 
 195. Id. at 369–72. 
 196. Id. at 388. 
 197. Id.
 198. Id. at 388–90; see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 428–29 (1988) 
(declining to create a Bivens remedy for alleged due process violations arising out of the 
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   More recently, in Wilkie v. Robbins, the Court relied on similar reasoning 
to deny a Bivens remedy to a private landowner alleging that the Bureau 
of Land Management violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.199 
That case concerned allegations that the bureau had engaged in years of 
“harassment and intimidation” aimed at securing for the government an 
easement over the landowner’s property.200 In denying the plaintiff a Bivens 
remedy for his allegations, the Court lamented the “difficulty of devising 
a workable cause of action” encompassing the landowner’s complaints.201 
Indeed, in the Court’s view, “[a] judicial standard to identify illegitimate 
pressure going beyond legitimately hard bargaining would be endlessly 
knotty to work out, and a general provision for tortlike liability . . . would 
invite an onslaught of Bivens actions.”202  In such a case, the Court 
concluded, Congress is better suited to “tailor [a] remedy to the problem 
perceived.”203
   The concerns expressed in Bush and Wilkie do not apply here.  Unlike 
Bush, Congress has not enacted an “elaborate remedial system” designed 
to redress violations of international law causing death.204  Thus, in 
determining whether to create a common law remedy for these violations, 
courts need not engage in the kind of detailed policy analysis better left 
to the institutional competence of the legislature.205  Indeed, to the extent 
that Congress has implemented a remedial framework addressing violations 
of international law, the legislature has acknowledged and affirmed the 
judiciary’s role in developing the federal government’s response to these 
denial of Social Security benefits because “Congress is the body charged with making 
the inevitable compromises required in the design of [the] massive and complex welfare 
benefits program” embodied by the federal Social Security system). 
199.  Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 547–48, 561–62 (2007). 
 200. Id. at 542–47. 
 201. Id. at 562. 
 202. Id.
 203. Id.
 204. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983).  As discussed above, only four
federal statutes address violations of international law causing death: the TVPA, 28 
U.S.C. § 1605A, the Flatow Amendment, and DOHSA.  See supra note 182.  This 
statutory scheme does not come close to matching the comprehensive regulatory structure at 
issue in Bush.  See Bush, 462 U.S. at 385 (describing the regulatory protections afforded 
federal civil service employees as an “elaborate, comprehensive scheme” built by decades of 
legislation, “Executive Orders, and the promulgation of detailed regulations by the Civil 
Service Commission” (citation omitted)); see also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 
424 (1988) (describing the Social Security system as affecting “virtually every American” 
and “‘of a size and extent difficult to comprehend’” (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 399 (1971))). 
 205. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 388 (stating that the decision to “augment[]” the civil 
service system necessitates “a thorough understanding of the existing regulatory structure and
the respective costs and benefits that would result from the addition of another remedy 
for violations of employees’ First Amendment rights”). 
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violations through common law legislation.206  In that regard, unlike Wilkie, 
courts are perfectly capable of crafting wrongful death causes of action 
that balance the competing interests of victims and tortfeasors, and to the 
extent they need guidance, wrongful death legislation at both the state 
and federal level provides a plethora of examples to steer judicial 
discretion.207 
The question remains, however, whether “special factors” unique to 
the ATS setting counsel against the creation of a common law remedy 
for death in violation of international law.  Of particular relevance here 
is the Supreme Court’s directive in Sosa that courts should be “wary of 
impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in 
managing foreign affairs” for fear that judicially crafted remedies 
addressing international law violations “would raise risks of adverse foreign 
policy consequences.”208 
Several doctrinal safeguards, however, assuage these concerns.  First, 
under Sosa, any wrongful death remedy would be available only against 
conduct that violates a norm of international law already meeting the 
high bar of general acceptance and clear definition outlined by the 
Supreme Court.209  This rigorous standard acts to limit undue judicial 
 206. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 3–4 (1991) (citing with approval Filartiga’s 
recognition of a cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing and stating that courts 
“should . . . permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the 
future into rules of customary international law”); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 
U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004) (“Congress has not in any relevant way amended § 1350 or 
limited civil common law power by another statute.”).
 207. The Moragne decision is particularly on point here.  In that case, the Supreme 
Court rejected arguments that the federal courts would be at a loss in determining the 
content of a nonstatutory cause of action for wrongful death. See Moragne v. States 
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 405 (1970).  Such “fears,” the Court concluded, “are 
exaggerated” because “[i]n most respects the law applied in personal-injury cases will 
answer all questions that arise” and “numerous state wrongful-death acts have been 
implemented with success for decades.” See id. at 405–06, 408.  As Justice Harlan aptly
stated, “The experience thus built up counsels that a suit for wrongful death raises no
problems unlike those that have long been grist for the judicial mill.”  Id. at 408. 
 208. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727–28; see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“[T]he danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the 
conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context of the ATS, because the question is
not what Congress has done but instead what courts may do.”). 
 209. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (“[F]ederal courts should not recognize private 
claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less 
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms 
familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”). 
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interference into foreign policy as “courts can then focus on the application 
of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive 
task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest 
or with international justice.”210  Second, even where the application of 
clearly established international principles would raise foreign policy 
concerns, courts may assess the political implications of creating a wrongful 
death remedy using well-worn principles of political question doctrine211 
or as the Court itself acknowledged, a “policy of case-specific deference to 
the political branches.”212  In all events, although there may be situations 
where a wrongful death remedy is inappropriate, that determination can 
be made on a case-by-case basis and need not preclude the recognition of 
this common law cause of action as a general matter. 
Accordingly, for these reasons, courts should recognize a cause of 
action under federal common law for the death of an individual caused 
by a violation of international law. 
2. Identity of the Wrongful Death Claimant
   Having determined that applicable law militates in favor of a wrongful 
death remedy in the ATS context, I now turn to the details of that cause 
of action, specifically, the class of persons eligible to bring suit.  The 
Supreme Court has made clear that in crafting federal common law rules, 
courts must adhere to the general “presumption” that forum state law 
supplies the rules of decision in the vast majority of cases.213  Courts  
may develop “uniform federal rules” to fill the interstices of federal law 
only when the federal scheme at issue “evidences a distinct need for 
nationwide legal standards” or “when express provisions in analogous 
statutory schemes embody congressional policy choices readily applicable 
to the matter at hand.”214  In all other circumstances, forum state law 
should provide the rules of decision, “unless application of [the particular] 
state law [in question] would frustrate specific objectives of the federal 
 210. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). 
 211. See, e.g., Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(dismissing ATS claim on political question grounds). 
 212. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21. 
 213. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991); see also Nw. 
Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (holding that federal 
courts must be cautious in fashioning common law rules because “the federal lawmaking 
power is vested in the legislative, not the judicial, branch of government”); Wheeldin v. 
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (noting that the situations justifying the creation of a
federal common law rule are “few and restricted”).
 214. See Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98. 
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programs.”215 These factors counsel the adoption of forum state law as 
the rules of decision for determining the class of plaintiffs eligible to 
bring suit for a death in violation of international law. 
a. Necessity of Nationwide Legal Standards 
First, there is no “distinct need for nationwide legal standards” regarding 
the proper plaintiff in these cases.  In the seminal case Clearfield Trust 
Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court relied on this concern for 
national uniformity to fashion uniform federal rules regarding the rights 
and duties of the United States with respect to its commercial paper.216 
In that case, the U.S. Treasury sought reimbursement for a payment it 
had issued pursuant to a forged check collected by Clearfield Trust 
Company as agent for J.C. Penney Company.217  The Court first 
determined that federal law governs “[t]he duties imposed upon the 
United States and the rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance” of 
its commercial paper.218  Then, with respect to the content of that federal 
law, the Court rejected the lower court’s call to apply the laws of the 
forum state, observing that “[t]he issuance of commercial paper by the 
United States is on a vast scale and transactions in that paper from 
issuance to payment will commonly occur in several states.”219  To leave 
these transactions “to the vagaries of the laws of the several states,” the 
Court held, would “subject the rights and duties of the United States to 
exceptional uncertainty.”220 
This concern for avoiding uncertainty is less important, however, 
where the rights and duties at issue are tangential to the core question of 
liability.  In O’Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 
the FDIC, as receiver to a troubled corporation, sued the law firm 
O’Melveny & Myers for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary 
duty in connection with the firm’s work for the corporation on several 
real estate transactions.221  O’Melveny argued that the FDIC was estopped 
from pursuing its claims because certain of the corporation’s executives 
 215. See id. (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 
(1979)) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 216. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943). 
 217. Id. at 364–66. 
 218. Id. at 366. 
 219. Id. at 367. 
 220. Id.
 221. See O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 81–82 (1994). 
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had engaged in malfeasance with respect to these transactions and 
California law imputed the executives’ knowledge of wrongdoing to the 
FDIC as receiver.222  The FDIC argued in response that the Court should 
fashion a uniform federal rule against the imputation of the executives’ 
knowledge to the FDIC.223  The Court rejected the FDIC’s request, 
concluding that the FDIC’s stated interest in promoting national uniformity 
on the imputation question was insufficient to justify the creation of a 
uniform federal rule.224  In so holding, the Court reasoned that the 
imputation rules at issue “affect only the FDIC’s rights and liabilities, as 
receiver, with respect to primary conduct on the part of private actors 
that has already occurred.”225  Thus, although the adoption of federal rules 
in such cases may ease the litigation burden on the FDIC by “eliminating 
state-by-state research and reducing uncertainty,” so “generic” an interest in 
avoiding the “ordinary consequences” of nationwide litigation could not 
support the exercise of judicial discretion requested.226 
Under this case law, there is no “distinct need” for national standards 
on the question of who is the proper plaintiff in wrongful death actions 
under Sosa.  Unlike the rules at issue in Clearfield, these proper plaintiff 
rules do not implicate the “rights and duties” of the parties regarding the 
core question of liability.227 Rather, as in O’Melveny, these rules concern 
only the tangential question of who may bring suit based on “primary 
conduct . . . that has already occurred.”228 Thus, as was the case with the 
FDIC, although the creation of a uniform federal rule on this issue may 
ease the litigation burden on Sosa plaintiffs, this interest in avoiding the 
“ordinary consequences” of litigation is too “generic” to displace the 
usual presumption in favor of state law.229  This is particularly true given 
the fact that the plaintiffs in ATS actions, like all plaintiffs, can choose 
 222. Id. at 82–83. 
 223. Id. at 85. 
 224. Id. at 87–88. 
 225. Id. at 88. 
 226. Id.
 227. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943); see 
also 2 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 13:34 (“A personal representative proceeding
under wrongful death statutes requiring him to bring the action for the benefit of certain
designated beneficiaries is a mere nominal party having no interest in the case for 
himself or the estate he represents.”).
 228. O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 87–88; see also Glenn v. Johnson, 764 N.E.2d 47, 52 
(Ill. 2002) (“The personal representative is merely a nominal party to this action, 
effectively filing suit as a statutory trustee on behalf of the surviving spouse and next of 
kin, who are the true parties in interest.”).
 229. See O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 88; cf. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 347 
n.13 (1966) (observing that the “desirability of a uniform federal rule” does not justify
“failure to comply with reasonable requirements of local law” (quoting Bumb v. United
States, 276 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1960))). 
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the forum for litigation and thus have the ability to predetermine which 
state’s wrongful death rules will govern their claims.230 
b. Congressional Policy Choices 
Second, there are no “express provisions in analogous statutory schemes 
embody[ing] congressional policy choices” on the proper plaintiff issue.231 
In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Supreme 
Court held that provisions in a federal statute may serve as the basis for a 
federal common law rule where the provisions evince a congressional 
judgment regarding a point of law bearing a “close similarity” to the 
matter at hand.232  In that case, the Court concluded that section 10(b) of 
the National Labor Relations Act would supply the limitations period for 
an employee’s claims for wrongful termination and unfair representation.233 
In rejecting analogous limitations periods from state law, the Court held 
that section 10(b) is “actually designed to accommodate a balance of 
interests very similar to that at stake” in the case at bar.234  The Court 
determined that in enacting section 10(b), “Congress established a 
limitations period attuned to what it viewed as the proper balance between 
the national interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality of 
private settlements, and an employee’s interest in setting aside what he 
views as an unjust settlement under the collective-bargaining system.”235 
Thus, the Court concluded, section 10(b) represented a “more appropriate 
vehicle for interstitial lawmaking” than forum state law.236 
With respect to the proper plaintiff issue, there are no express provisions 
of analogous federal statutes evidencing a congressional judgment on the 
proper plaintiff in cases alleging death in violation of international law. 
The federal statutory scheme most analogous to a wrongful death action 
 230. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (noting that venue 
statutes “are drawn with a necessary generality and usually give a plaintiff a choice of 
courts, so that he may be quite sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy”); 
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 10, at 397–98 (discussing choice of forum for human rights 
plaintiffs in U.S. courts). 
 231. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991). 
232.  DelCostello v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 170–71 (1983). 
 233. See id. at 154–55. 
 234. See id. at 165, 169. 
 235. Id. at 171 (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 70–71
(1981)) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 236. Id. at 172. 
427 
under Sosa is the TVPA.237 As the Supreme Court described, this statute 
represents Congress’s attempt to codify certain aspects of the common 
law remedy for torts in violation of international law first recognized in 
Filartiga.238  In that regard, the TVPA creates a statutory cause of action 
for the extrajudicial killing of an individual, actionable by that individual’s 
“legal representative” or “any person who may be a claimant in an action 
for wrongful death.”239  Notably, however, the TVPA is silent on the 
precise definitions of these two categories of claimants.240  Instead, the 
legislative intent discernible from the statute indicates that state law supplies 
the rules of decision on this issue.241  Thus, to the extent Congress has 
 237. See supra note 180–82 and accompanying text. 
 238. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728, 731 (2004). 
239.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil Action § 2(a)(2)). 
 240. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
241. Normally, undefined terms in a federal statute of national application are defined 
by reference to federal standards.  See, e.g., Info-Hold Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 
F.3d 448, 455–56 (6th Cir. 2008); Spina v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 470 F.3d 116, 126 
(2d Cir. 2006).  However, where Congress indicates an intent to define such terms by 
reference to state law, courts must defer to the legislature’s expectations.  See Reconstruction 
Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Cnty., 328 U.S. 204, 209–10 (1946).  In Reconstruction Finance, 
the Supreme Court found just this sort of legislative intent with respect to the term real 
property in the federal Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act (RFCA).  Id. at 206, 
210.  The RFCA provided that any “real property” of certain federal agencies would be 
subject to the same state and local taxes as “other real property” in the state in which 
such federal property was located.  Id. at 206. In holding that the term real property 
should be defined in accordance with applicable state law, the Court reasoned that 
Congress intended this result by subjecting this type of property to municipal taxation in 
the first place.  Id. at 209 (“Congress, in permitting local taxation of the real property, 
made it impossible to apply the law with uniform tax consequences in each state and 
locality.”).  “Concepts of real property are deeply rooted in state traditions, customs, 
habits, and laws,” the Court observed, and “[l]ocal tax administration is geared to those
concepts.”  Id. at 210.  By subjecting federal “real property” to municipal taxation, the 
Court determined, the RFCA necessarily indicated a congressional intent to define 
that term in accordance with the states’ “long-standing practice of assessments and 
collections.” Id. 
A similar congressional intent to incorporate state law is evident in the TVPA’s 
“extrajudicial killing” provision.  As described above, that provision permits both the 
victim’s “legal representative” and a designated wrongful death “claimant” to bring suit
for damages.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil Action 
§ 2(a)(2)).  In so doing, the statute creates a damages remedy for both the harm suffered 
by the victim and the harm caused by the victim’s death; in other words, the statute 
creates both a survival claim and a wrongful death claim based on an extrajudicial 
killing. See Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1347–48 (11th Cir.
2011) (holding that the TVPA permits “appropriate wrongful death claimants to be 
able to sue alongside representatives of the deceased”).  State law has long been the
primary source of law on questions of survivorship and wrongful death, and many state 
statutes expressly define both who may be a victim’s “personal representative” in a 
survival action and who the proper “claimants” may be in a wrongful death action.  See 
generally 1 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 1:9.  Thus, as in Reconstruction 
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expressed any “policy choices” with respect to the proper claimant in 
cases alleging international law violations causing death, the legislature’s 
judgment is that forum state law should supply the rules of decision.242 
c. Frustration of Important Federal Interests 
The final consideration—whether the application of a particular state 
law would frustrate important federal interests—is context specific and 
depends on the facts of each case.243  However, to the extent that reliance 
on forum state law in a wrongful death action under Sosa would result in 
only some of the victim’s surviving relatives being eligible to bring 
suit, 244 state law should still supply the rules of decision. 
Finance, by creating causes of action so rooted in state law concepts, the TVPA 
necessarily indicates a legislative intent to integrate applicable state law definitions into 
its remedial scheme.  Cf. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155–56 (1944) 
(defining the term public utility in the federal Price Control Act in terms of state law 
because “[t]he great body of law in this country which controls acquisition, transmission, 
and transfer of property, and defines the rights of its owners in relation to the state or to 
private parties, is found in the statutes and decisions of the state”).
This intent is further confirmed by the House Committee Report on the legislation that
became the TVPA, which expressly states that “[c]ourts may look to state law for 
guidance as to which parties would be proper wrongful death claimants” under the 
statute.  See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4 (1991). 
242. Congressional guidance on the proper plaintiff issue can also arguably be 
gleaned from the DOHSA, which designates a decedent’s “personal representative” as 
the proper plaintiff in an action involving death on the high seas.  See 46 U.S.C. § 30302 
(2006).  As described, however, DOHSA is inapposite to Sosa claims alleging deaths in 
violation of international law generally.  See supra note 182.  Moreover, even if DOHSA 
were to supply the rule of decision on the proper plaintiff issue, the statute itself still 
does not define precisely who is the decedent’s “proper representative,” again indicating 
that forum state law governs this issue.  See supra note 241; see also Complaint of 
Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., S.A., 453 F. Supp. 265, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that
the term “‘personal representative’” in DOHSA “‘refer[s] to one who receives authority
of some sort from a state’” (quoting Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 F.2d 841, 842 
(2d Cir. 1946))). 
 243. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4518 (2d ed. 1996) (describing different contexts 
in which courts have concluded that the application of state law would disrupt a stated 
federal purpose). 
 244. See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 191 (D. Mass. 1995) (applying 
federal law to determine who is the proper plaintiff to sue in an ATS case alleging death
in violation of international law where the application of state law would have precluded
recovery by the decedent’s sister). 
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Indeed, the application of state law to an interstitial question of federal 
law does not undermine the effectiveness of a federal remedial scheme 
simply because the state law permits recovery for only certain classes of 
plaintiffs.  In Robertson v. Wegmann, the Supreme Court addressed whether 
a state survival statute was “inconsistent” with federal law where the 
statute dictated that only certain of the decedent’s surviving relatives could 
maintain the underlying § 1983 action on behalf of the deceased.245  In  
that case, the original plaintiff in the lawsuit died before his case went to 
trial, and the executor of his estate was subsequently substituted as 
the plaintiff.246  On appeal, the petitioners argued that the case should 
be dismissed because state survivorship law applied to the question of 
survival of claims, and under this law, the executor was not among the 
class of individuals authorized to maintain a survival action.247  The  
Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners, reasoning that although the 
application of state law in this case would bar the plaintiff’s suit, the state 
law in question was not “inhospitable” to survivorship claims in general 
because it permitted the survival of claims in the majority of cases.248  As 
the Court explained, “A state statute cannot be considered ‘inconsistent’ 
with federal law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the 
litigation.”249
   Robertson’s reasoning is equally applicable to the situation where the 
application of state law would permit only a certain class of relatives to 
bring wrongful death claims under Sosa.  As the Supreme Court held, 
Congress understood the common law claim identified in Sosa as 
providing a meaningful remedy to aliens for violations of international 
law.250  As in Robertson, this remedial purpose is not undermined simply 
because one class of plaintiffs is barred from recovery.251  So long as the 
applicable state law is not generally “inhospitable” to wrongful death 
claims—the state law does not bar wrongful death claims altogether or 
otherwise restrict wrongful death actions in an “unreasonable” manner— 
245.  Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 586–87 (1978). 
 246. Id.
 247. Id. at 587. 
 248. Id. at 594. 
 249. Id. at 593; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006) (allowing courts to look to “the
constitution and statutes of the State wherein” when federal-jurisdiction-granting statutes 
are insufficient “to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law”).
 250. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716–17 (2004) (observing that 
the ATS was most likely meant to address “concern over the inadequate vindication of 
the law of nations”); see also Casto, supra note 78, at 499–500 (explaining that the 
historical record indicates the ATS was meant to be a “broad, sweeping provision” addressing 
“all foreseeable and unforeseeable violations by individuals of the law of nations”).
 251. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 593. 
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state law should still govern the question of proper plaintiff.252  Thus, as 
in the case of § 1983 actions, the applicability of state law should not 
turn “solely on which side is advantaged thereby.”253  This is so because 
“[i]f success of the [action] were the only benchmark, there would be no 
reason at all to look to state law, for the appropriate rule would then always 
be the one favoring the plaintiff, and its source would be essentially 
irrelevant.”254
   Accordingly, in the vast majority of cases, forum state law should 
determine the identity of the proper plaintiff in Sosa actions seeking 
recovery for the death of an individual caused by a violation of 
international law. 
3. Survival Claims Under Sosa
   The survivorship of Sosa claims presents a related yet distinct question 
from whether to recognize a common law cause of action for death in 
violation of international law.  Survivorship rules determine whether an 
existing claim survives the death of the injured party as an asset of the 
party’s estate, whereas wrongful death rules establish a new cause of 
action, accruing to specified beneficiaries, for damages arising from 
the injured party’s death.255  As Speiser and Rooks describe, “Although 
originating in the same wrongful act or neglect, the cause of action which 
survives . . . is for the wrong to the injured person, while the wrongful 
death action . . . is for the wrong to the beneficiaries.”256 Because of these 
theoretical differences, the relevant inquiry with respect to the survivorship 
of Sosa claims is not whether courts should recognize a new cause of 
action upon the injured party’s death but rather whether governing law 
provides for the survival, or continuation, of the party’s existing claim 
after the party’s death.257 
 252. Id. at 591–94. 
 253. Id. at 593. 
 254. Id.
 255. DOBBS, supra note 129, § 294. 
256.  1 SPEISER & ROOKS, supra note 101, § 1:13. 
 257. Cf. Estate of Masselli ex rel. Masselli v. Silverman, 606 F. Supp. 341, 343 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that in a case alleging injuries to a deceased victim of federal 
civil rights violations, the “right of action belongs to the [decedent],” and thus, the viability of 
his claims does not turn on whether the plaintiff in the lawsuit has a cause of action for 
the decedent’s death but rather whether the decedent’s claims themselves survive his death 
under federal law). 
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   The survivorship rules governing a federal claim are a matter of federal 
law, or more specifically here, federal common law.258  As described above, 
federal common law normally incorporates state law as the substantive 
rules of decision in a given case.259  However, a court may set aside state 
law and instead craft uniform federal rules where there is a distinct need 
for national uniformity, where related federal legislation evidences 
congressional policy choices on an analogous point of law, or where the 
application of a particular state law would frustrate important federal 
interests.260 
With respect to the survivorship of Sosa claims, federal courts should 
adopt a uniform federal rule drawn from the limited guidance on this 
issue offered by Congress in the TVPA.  As described above, the TVPA 
represents the principal legislative statement on the scope of domestic 
remedies for international law torts since the ATS.261  Therefore, to the 
extent the statute speaks to the issue of survivorship of claims, these 
provisions reflect the balance struck by Congress between the interests 
of providing adequate remedies for these international law violations and 
limiting these actions to certain classes of claimants.262 
In that regard, the TVPA prescribes a bifurcated rule of survival for 
claims of torture and extrajudicial killing.  With respect to torture claims, 
 258. See 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1952 (3d ed. 2007) (“In a federal-question case, 
federal law and federal decisions, rather than state law, determine whether the 
action survives the death of a party . . . .” (citing Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76, 80 
(1884))); cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980) (“Bivens actions are a creation of 
federal law and, therefore, the question whether respondent’s action survived [the 
decedent’s] death is a question of federal law.”).
 259. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730–31 (2004) (observing that the TVPA offers the legislature’s 
rejoinder to the federal courts’ assumption of common law power with the Filartiga line 
of cases).
 262. Cf. DelCostello v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 (1983) 
(holding that section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act was “designed to 
accommodate a balance of interests very similar” to those at stake in determining the 
statute of limitations on claims for wrongful termination and unfair representation).  In 
the recent case Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (2010), the Ninth Circuit held 
that the DOHSA governed the survivorship of Sosa claims arising out of alleged 
international law violations occurring off the coast of Nigeria.  Id. at 1125–26 (“DOHSA 
preempts all survival claims for deaths on the high seas unless there is clear indication 
that Congress intended otherwise.”).  The court’s ruling, however, necessarily turned on 
the fact that the Sosa claims at issue alleged international law violations occurring on the 
“high seas.” See id.  Therefore, assuming Bowoto’s reasoning is accurate, DOHSA would 
still not prescribe the survivorship rule for other types of Sosa claims.  Rather, as described 
above, the TVPA represents Congress’s most relevant statement on the applicable 
survivorship rule. 
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only the torture victim may bring suit against the alleged torturer.263  There 
is no provision for the survival of torture claims beyond the victim’s 
death.264  By contrast, in the case of extrajudicial killing, the statute permits 
the victim’s “legal representative” to bring suit for damages on behalf of 
the decedent.265  Thus, under the TVPA, claims of torture abate upon the 
victim’s death, while claims of extrajudicial killing survive and may be 
pursued by the victim’s “legal representative.”  In accordance with this 
framework, Sosa claims should be subject to a similar survivorship rule 
providing that claims based on fatal injury, like extrajudicial killing, 
survive to the decedents’ estate, while claims based on nonfatal injury, 
like torture, abate upon the victim’s death.
   This bifurcated survivorship rule is consistent with the Court’s reasoning 
in the analogous setting of Bivens litigation.  In Carlson v. Green, 
discussed previously, the Supreme Court held that a Bivens claim based 
on a constitutional deprivation causing fatal injury survives the death of 
the alleged victim.266  In that regard, the Court concluded that “whenever 
the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought 
against defendants whose conduct results in death, the federal common 
law allows survival of that action.”267  The Court stressed that its holding 
turned on the “essentiality of the survival of civil rights claims for 
complete vindication of constitutional rights” in cases alleging fatal 
injury.268  To rule otherwise, the Court pronounced, would “frustrate in 
[an] important way the achievement of the goals of Bivens actions.”269 
In fashioning this common law rule of survivorship, Carlson 
distinguished an earlier precedent set by Robertson v. Wegmann, also 
discussed above, wherein the Supreme Court held that a constitutional 
tort claim under § 1983 would abate in accordance with the law of the 
 263. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil Action § 2(a)(1)). 
 264. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 192 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that 
the TVPA “is conspicuously silent on the question of whether a third party may bring
suit on behalf of a tortured relative”). 
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (Establishment of Civil Action § 2(a)(2)); see also 
Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1347, 1348 n.11 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that the TVPA permits the recovery of damages suffered by the deceased victim of 
an extrajudicial killing).
 266. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23–25 (1980). 
 267. Id. at 24 (quoting Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 675 (7th Cir. 1978), aff’d, 
446 U.S. 14 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 268. Id. (quoting Green, 581 F.2d at 674) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 269. Id. at 25 (alteration in original) (quoting UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 702 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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forum state.270  The Court reasoned that Robertson was inapposite 
because the plaintiff’s death in that case “was not caused by the acts of 
the defendants upon which the suit was based.”271  As a result, there was 
little concern that allowing the plaintiff’s claim to abate would undermine 
the remedial policies underlying the federal civil rights statutes.272  By  
contrast, in Carlson, the alleged illegal conduct did in fact cause the 
plaintiff’s death, increasing the risk that potential tortfeasors could take 
advantage of disparate state survivorship rules to avoid liability.273 
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that where the illegality alleged causes 
the plaintiff’s death, only a uniform federal rule of survivorship is 
“compatible” with the goal of providing adequate vindication of 
constitutional rights.274
   The survivorship rule for Sosa claims suggested above comports with 
this reasoning.  As in Carlson, the proposed rule acknowledges that the 
survival of a Sosa claim based on fatal injury is essential to the vindication 
of the remedial policies animating these common law actions.275  The  
Supreme Court understood the common law remedy identified in Sosa as 
providing a vehicle for the vindication of widely accepted and clearly 
defined international law norms in federal court.276  This policy would 
be subverted without a rule allowing for the survival of claims alleging 
international law torts causing fatal injury.  The reasoning of the lower 
court in Carlson, which the Supreme Court ultimately adopted, is on 
point: “Allowing recovery for injury but denying relief for the ultimate 
injury—death—would mean that it would be more advantageous for a 
 270. See id. at 24–25 (distinguishing Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978)).
 271. Id. at 24.  Moreover, the Court noted that the claims at issue in Robertson— 
federal civil rights claims against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—are statutorily 
obligated to incorporate forum state law where federal law is silent on a matter of 
remedial procedure, so long as the state law is not “inconsistent” with federal law. Id. at 
24 n.11 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)).  The Court noted that Bivens claims are not 
subject to the same statutory incorporation requirement and “cogent reasons” argued 
against the application of state law to the particular survival question presented in Carlson, 
namely, the survivorship of a federal constitutional tort claim based on fatal injury. See 
id.
 272. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592 (holding that “in situations in which there is 
no claim that the illegality caused the plaintiff’s death,” the application of a state survival
rule that would abate the plaintiff’s claim “surely would not adversely affect § 1983’s 
role in preventing official illegality”).
 273. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 24, 25 & n.12 (holding that application of state 
survivorship law to Bivens claims where the alleged illegality caused the victim’s death 
would undermine the remedial purpose of Bivens actions because “an official could 
know at the time he decided to act whether his intended victim’s claim would survive”). 
 274. Id. at 23. 
 275. Id. (“[O]nly a uniform federal rule of survivorship will suffice to redress the 
constitutional deprivation here alleged and to protect against repetition of such conduct.”). 
 276. See supra notes 25–44 and accompanying text. 
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tortfeasor to kill rather than to injure.  Surely this cannot be the intent of 
the law.”277  In line with this reasoning, the proposed survivorship rule 
permits the survival of Sosa claims based on fatal injury. 
The same cannot be said, however, about Sosa claims based on nonfatal 
injury.  As Carlson acknowledged, different considerations apply where 
the plaintiff’s death was not caused by the illegal conduct alleged.278 
Indeed, Carlson expressly limited its survivorship holding to Bivens 
claims based on fatal injury, while distinguishing the rationale in its 
previous precedent Robertson as applying to claims based on nonfatal 
injury.279  In that regard, Robertson stands for the proposition that where 
the plaintiff’s death was not caused by the illegality alleged, a rule 
permitting claim survival is unnecessary to secure the benefits of a given 
remedial scheme.280  A similar judgment is evidenced by the TVPA in 
the context of a nonfatal violation of international law.281  Although a 
different policy choice may be valid, the judicial deference outlined in 
Sosa commands that the common law rules applicable to Sosa claims 
adhere as closely as possible to Congress’s expressed judgment.282 
Thus, in accordance with this congressional intent, the proposed 
survivorship rule would abate Sosa claims based on nonfatal injury upon 
the victim’s death. 
Based on this reasoning, courts should adopt a survivorship rule for 
Sosa claims providing that those claims based on nonfatal injury abate 
upon the victim’s death, while those based on fatal injury survive to the 
decedent’s estate. 
4. Identity of the Survival Claimant 
The TVPA also points to the appropriate rules of decision for 
determining who is the proper plaintiff in a survival suit under Sosa.  
The TVPA provides that in the case of an extrajudicial killing, a victim’s 
“legal representative” may bring suit for damages on behalf of the 
277.  Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 674 (7th Cir. 1978), aff’d, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 278. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 24–25 (observing that the abatement of a federal civil 
rights claim would not undermine the remedial purpose of federal civil rights law where 
“the plaintiff’s death was not caused by the acts of the defendants upon which the suit 
was based”).
 279. See id.
 280. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592–93 (1978). 
 281. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (Establishment of Civil Action). 
 282. See supra notes 143–49 and accompanying text. 
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deceased.283 Although the statute itself does not define “legal 
representative,” the discernible congressional intent indicates that this 
term should be applied in accordance with state law.284
   The survivorship rule for Sosa claims should similarly rely on state 
law to determine who may bring a survival suit.  As with the statute’s 
main survivorship rule, the TVPA’s claimant provisions express Congress’s 
considered judgment on the issue of who precisely may bring suit on 
behalf of a deceased victim of international rights abuses.  Moreover, 
this direction to incorporate state law as the applicable rule of decision 
comports with the general practice of adopting forum state rules to fill 
the interstices in federal remedial schemes.285  Thus, in accordance with 
the congressional intent expressed in the TVPA, the proper plaintiff in a 
survival suit under Sosa should be determined by reference to forum 
state law. 
* * * 
In sum, under the wrongful death-survivorship approach proposed 
here, state law primarily governs the question of whether the surviving 
relatives of a deceased victim of international law violations can bring 
suit in ATS cases based on harm to the decedent.  The putative plaintiffs’ 
authority to bring suit would be framed not as a statutory standing 
question but rather as a merits inquiry into the availability of wrongful 
death or survival damages.  With respect to those claims pressing wrongful 
death damages, federal common law supplies the cause of action, while 
forum state law—incorporated as federal law—would provide the rules 
of decision determining the plaintiffs’ eligibility to bring suit.  As for 
those claims seeking survival damages, federal common law, as guided 
by the TVPA, would allow for the survival of only those Sosa claims 
based on fatal injury.  Moreover, state survivorship law—also incorporated 
as federal law—would govern the question of who precisely could bring 
suit in the resulting survivorship action. 
B.  Advantages of the Proposed Approach 
The proposed wrongful death-survival framework improves upon the 
prevailing Xuncax approach in a number of ways.  First, this new approach 
abandons Xuncax’s conceptually flawed standing formulation in favor of 
283.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (Establishment of Civil Action § 2(a)(2)). 
 284. See supra note 241. 
 285. See supra note 213. 
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a cause of action analysis more in line with governing precedent.286  By 
framing the deceased-victim issue as a pure merits determination, the 
proposed analysis focuses attention on the true nature of the inquiry, that 
is, whether to recognize a wrongful death cause of action and rule of 
survivorship.  Indeed, with respect to those Sosa claims seeking wrongful 
death damages, the prevailing standing formulation assumes without 
analysis that a cause of action already exists for death in violation of 
international law and that the only question remaining is whether the 
particular plaintiffs are authorized to assert that action as a matter of 
law.287  In truth, however, by borrowing “standing” requirements from 
the TVPA, the court created a new cause of action—a new federal 
remedy—without confronting the various limitations attendant to that 
exercise of judicial power.288 
A similar obfuscation occurs with respect to Sosa claims seeking 
survival damages.  Again, the Xuncax approach focuses exclusively on the 
plaintiff’s ability to raise the decedent’s claim in a representative capacity. 
In so doing, however, this analysis ignores the preliminary question of 
whether the claim at issue survives the decedent’s death in the first place. 
Basic principles of tort law, however, dictate that a person’s claim abates 
upon that person’s death absent explicit injunction to the contrary.289 
Xuncax fails to come to terms with this rule and skips immediately to the 
issue of the proper plaintiff to bring suit on behalf of the decedent.  The 
proposed approach, by contrast, forces courts to confront this issue 
squarely, thereby producing clearer doctrine more aligned with precedent.290
   In addition to these conceptual improvements, the proposed framework 
also provides the federal courts with clearer guidance on the resolution 
of the deceased-victim issue.  As described above, even accepting the 
Xuncax framework’s standing formulation, the federal courts continued 
to express uncertainty regarding the proper application of the framework’s 
 286. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 189 (D. Mass. 1995). 
 287. Id. at 189–92. 
 288. See supra notes 140–77 and accompanying text. 
 289. See 1 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 87, § 51; see also Henshaw v. Miller, 58 U.S. 
(17 How.) 212, 224 (1854) (“[T]his action did not survive the death of the defendant, but
abated upon the occurrence of that event . . . .”). 
 290. See 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 3531.6 (noting that “[a]s to private 
disputes, it would be good to displace standing by direct inquiry into the existence of a claim
for an available remedy” because a cause of action analysis “is more likely to yield cogent 
results” than complex standing tests in the majority of cases). 
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analysis, particularly its choice of law rule.291  The proposed approach 
reduces this uncertainty by grounding its analysis in longstanding principles 
of federal common law.292  Whereas under Xuncax, courts must utilize 
the ambiguous standard of whether the application of a given state law 
leaves a decedent’s relatives with “no remedy whatsoever,” the proposed 
approach directs courts to principles of federal common law for the 
appropriate rules of decision, a rubric that points to well-developed state 
law on wrongful death and survivorship.293  By offering courts a defined 
body of legal principles from which to draw decisional rules, the proposed 
approach promotes greater consistency in the resolution of international 
law tort cases brought in federal court. 
A potential objection to this proposed framework argues that reliance 
on state law rules of decision would in fact engender greater uncertainty 
in the litigation of the proper plaintiff issue.  However, any “uncertainty” 
generated is simply the predictable consequence of our federal system, 
and as discussed, concerns over national uniformity do not justify 
displacement of generally applicable state law rules.294  Moreover, whatever 
“uncertainty” may result from adoption of the proposed approach would 
be less than the uncertainty attendant to the Xuncax formulation.  Indeed, 
as discussed above, Xuncax essentially leaves courts to apply some 
unspecified choice of law analysis that could potentially lead to the 
application of foreign state law.295  By contrast, the proposed approach 
points to well-settled federal common law rubrics and defined state rules 
on wrongful death and survival.  Even granting that some state law may 
too point to foreign law for the applicable rule of decision, at least under 
the proposed approach, that choice of law analysis will be spelled out in 
the relevant state jurisprudence. 
Critics of the proposed framework may also parrot Xuncax’s argument 
that state law is simply “ill-tailored for cases grounded on violations of the 
law of nations.”296  This position rests on a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the wrongful death-survivorship framework.  Under the proposed 
 291. See supra notes 106–28. 
 292. Accord Casto, supra note 47, at 644–45 (observing that given that ATS litigation is 
“so obviously analogous to Bivens litigation,” courts should “draw upon all the usual 
resources of the common law to fashion appropriate rules of decision”). 
 293. Accord Philip A. Scarborough, Note, Rules of Decision for Issues Arising 
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 460–62, 501 (2007) (arguing that 
in the vast majority of cases, federal common law rules developed under Sosa should adopt 
state law as the applicable rules of decision because state law constitutes “an understandable, 
well-defined, democratically sufficient body of law” on which federal courts can rely). 
 294. See supra notes 216–30 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text. 
296.  Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 192 (D. Mass. 1995). 
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approach, the law applied is federal law—federal common law, to be 
precise.  State law rules of decision become relevant only to the extent 
they are incorporated as federal common law.  More to the point, as 
described above, even if state law is not accustomed to dealing with the 
magnitude of present-day human rights violations, municipal regulations 
are certainly familiar with issues pertaining to recovery for death and 
personal injury, precisely the decisional rules relevant to the deceased-
victim issue.297 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes a solution to an increasingly common question 
in ATS litigation: Who is the proper plaintiff in suits where the actual 
victim of the international law violations alleged is deceased?  Contrary 
to prevailing jurisprudence, I contend that courts should view this 
question not as an issue of plaintiff standing but as a cause of action 
inquiry rooted in wrongful death and survivorship law.  By reframing the 
question in these terms, the proposed approach allows courts to focus on 
what is actually at stake in these deceased-victim cases: whether an 
individual who is the not the victim of the international law violation 
alleged may nonetheless seek a remedy for the illegal conduct at issue. 
Moreover, the proposed analysis avoids the unnecessary confusion wrought 
by the prevailing standing formulation and also ameliorates the uncertainty 
surrounding what body of law supplies the rules of decision on this issue. 
The resulting doctrine will be more consistent with governing precedent 
and easier for courts to apply in practice. 
   Beyond these tangible advantages, the proposed framework also serves as 
a model for deciphering other issues in ATS litigation unrelated to the 
defendant’s liability.  Sosa established that the standards and scope of 
liability in any ATS case are drawn principally from international law. 
Yet once the standards of liability are in place, a host of other questions 
arise that are just as important to the resolution of a particular case.  What, if 
any, nonstatutory immunities can a defendant assert?  Must plaintiffs 
exhaust domestic remedies before filing suit?298  What is the proper measure 
 297. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text. 
 298. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(imposing a prudential exhaustion requirement on ATS actions). 
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of damages?299 This Article suggests that the answers to these and related 
questions can be determined through the application of established 
principles of federal common law decisionmaking.  In that regard, judges 
hearing ATS disputes should be mindful of precedents in similar contexts 
where courts have crafted common law remedies for violations of legally 
enforceable rights. 
 299. See, e.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (crafting
federal common law rules to determine the amount of damages in an ATS action brought 
against Zimbabwean government officials). 
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